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The possibility of realizing savings to modernize and recapitalize the US Navy is 
of great importance to the Department of the Navy (DON).  Sea Enterprise is the vehicle 
for this effort.  The DON operates in an increasingly smaller, dangerous, and rapidly 
changing world.  Hence, the Navy and Marine Corps are attempting to change, adapt and 
transform to meet new threats to the United States in the twenty-first century.   
This thesis examines the Sea Enterprise Program from its inception in June 2002 
to May 2005.  A number of common business, public service, and management concepts 
are extracted and used to analyze the effort as a whole.  The goals and objectives, 
structures, responsibilities, processes, and results to date of Sea Enterprise are 
documented and recommendations are provided that may aid the acceleration of the 
effort.  
The results of this thesis reveal some identifiable challenges and issues that have 
inhibited the DON’s ability to realize the vision of Sea Power 21, and thus realize 
savings.  Cultural resistance to change, onerous bureaucratic frameworks, lack of 
accountability, and disincentives to save are a few examples of barriers the Navy must 
overcome.  To realize savings, recapitalize the fleet, and meet the twenty-first century 
threat (principally, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)), the Navy must address and 
surmount such barriers.        
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A. BACKGROUND  
The United States Navy and Marine Corps are changing, adapting and 
transforming to meet new threats to the United States in the twenty-first century.  
Currently, the Department of the Navy (DON) is transforming in response to a new 
national security posture as articulated in the Department of Defense (DOD) 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review (England, 2002).  Sea Power 21 is the strategic vision that 
serves as the vehicle for this transformation.  Furthermore, Sea Enterprise is the 
“business” initiative of the Sea Power 21 vision to become more effective and efficient in 
the twenty-first century and optimize resources at every level of the chain of command.   
In the past ten years, and most recently on 11 September 2001, asymmetrical 
threats to the United States have made it more challenging to bring the fight to our 
enemies.  Therefore, the Department of the Navy must replace Cold War-era systems 
with significantly more capable sensors, networks, weapons, and platforms to increase its 
ability to deter and defeat enemies.  Innovative concepts and technologies will integrate 
sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace to a greater extent than ever before.  Sea Enterprise, 
led by the Chief of Naval Operations, is key to this effort (Proceedings, 2002).  The 
purpose of Sea Enterprise as communicated by high level Navy leadership is: 
[To] return funds to the Department of the Navy that can be re-invested in 
the CNO’s transformational agenda (including modernization and re-
capitalization programs (Mullen, 2003)). 
Admiral Michael Mullen, Vice Chief of Naval Operations 
 
1. What is Transformation? 
Indeed, transformation is about change, however not all change is necessarily 
transformational.  Deep change is about letting go of firmly held beliefs and images of 
how our organization traditionally works.  That is, in order to transform, the DON must 
relinquish old mental models and forfeit the comfort of status quo. 
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Deep change…requires new ways of thinking and behaving.  It is change 
that is major in scope, discontinuous with the past and generally 
irreversible…Deep change means surrendering control.  
Robert E. Quinn 
 
2. Why Must the Department of the Navy Transform? 
The U.S. Navy operates in an increasingly smaller, dangerous, and rapidly 
changing world where there is only one constant…change itself.  In fact, the pace of 
change is accelerating, not diminishing with time – thus, time has become the one thing 
we all seem to have a lot less of (Nystrom, 2005).  Therefore, change within our Navy 
must be accelerated in order to catch and outrun the pace of change of the twenty-first 
century.   
Cultural resistance to change and military service parochialism have played a 
significant role in impeding past attempts to implement broad-based management reforms 
in DOD and DON alike.  If the barriers to change are not removed, DOD will continue to 
be faced with the business-as-usual mentality and its current endeavors to bring about 
substantive change to the department’s current flawed business operations will be 
unsuccessful (Kutz and Warren, 2002). 
The Navy’s current hierarchical structure and bureaucratic ways of doing business 
stifle innovation at the lower levels of the organization.  Further, there is disincentive to 
save (as well as execute efficiently, reduce in size, and eliminate programs/activities) at 
all levels, otherwise known as a “spend it or lose it” mentality, which greatly hinders the 
Navy’s goal to emerge more effective and efficient.  Sea Enterprise is a vehicle to 
influence new attitudes and behaviors to incentivize savings in support of Sea Power 21. 
The Department of the Navy’s basic business structure still resembles its 
industrial origins: vertical task organization, centralized hierarchy, and a 1960s-era 
budget-driven requirements determination leftover from when Robert McNamara was 
Secretary of Defense (1961-1968).  While [the Navy’s] structure may yield effective 
outcomes, it does so with little attention paid to efficiency (Nystrom, 2005).  
Furthermore, faced with increasingly austere funding, the Navy is pressured to do more 
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within given resources as requirements rise and funding levels remain flat or even decline 
(Nystrom, 2005).  The following subsections outline different perspectives that illustrate 
increasing operating costs, force structure trends, an aging force structure, and increasing 
manpower costs.    
 
a. The Federal Budget Perspective 
There are competing priorities within the federal budget and the 
Department of Defense.  The federal budget is comprised of expensive priorities and the 
government is beginning to feel the pressure of the increasing costs.  Among these 
federal priorities are: the cost of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and war in Iraq, 
the need to either transform or recapitalize within the base DOD budget, the rising costs 
in mandatory spending (especially Medicare), and the federal deficit and associated 
interest costs.  The global war on terror has cost the federal government approximately 
$230 billion to date.  Mandatory spending is increasing as a result of Social Security, 
healthcare entitlements, and interest on the national debt.  The deficit and the rise in 
mandatory spending have caused the top-line within the DOD budget to be constrained.  
Figure 1.1 depicts how taxpayer dollars were to be spent in FY05 and the percentage of 
those dollars that supported the Department of Defense. 
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FY 2005 Discretionary Funding Estimate 
($914B)
DoD Other Government Agencies
                                 
Source: Information derived from a PowerPoint brief given to the US Army, 26 February 2005:                 
“Sea Enterprise: Right Force, Right Readiness, Right Cost”, delivered by Mr. Mark Honecker 
(N40). 
 
Figure 1.1 Competing Priorities: A Federal Budget Perspective 
 
$178B 
FY 2005 Federal Budget Estimate 
($2,399B)










However, Figure 1.2 below is provided to more clearly illustrate the 
competing priorities within the federal budget and associated spending trends since the 
1940’s.  Specifically, Social Security and Medicare spending have increased while 
defense spending has decreased as a percentage of GDP. 









































Source: Joint Perspective on Defense Budget Issues; RDML Peter Daly, Deputy Director for 
Resources and Acquisitions (J-8) 
 
Figure 1.2 Federal Spending as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Of particular concern is the growth expected from FY03-FY09, with the 
following increases projected: Social Security, a 29% increase; Medicare, a 70% 
increase; and Medicaid, a 53% increase (Honecker, 2005).     
 
b. The Defense Budget Perspective 
The DON will need to identify savings because the Services are getting a 
smaller percentage of the DOD total obligational authority (TOA).  The services (Navy, 
Marine Corps, Army and Air Force) TOA is dropping relative to total DOD TOA; 
specifically, from 95% to 83.9% (Honecker, 2005).  Also, as a result of the war on 
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terrorism and the war in Iraq, the costs to operate the Navy are increasing.  Unfortunately, 
funding for GWOT and the war in Iraq will come at the expense of new funding for 
investment (Nystrom, 2005).  Therefore, other funds must come from a combination of 
cost reducing measures in four focus areas: 1.) reduce or stop funding to non-value added 
programs; 2.) reduce or eliminate fixed costs by cutting underutilized infrastructure, 
including labor; 3.) leverage innovation in technology and process change to increase 
productivity, and; 4.) reduce the cost of operations (Nystrom, 2005).  Furthermore, 
relative changes to individual service TOA tend to be on the margin.  The DOD TOA 
allocation is shown graphically in Figure 1.3. 
 


































NAVY AIR FORCE ARMY DEFENSE-WIDE
                  
Source: Information derived from a PowerPoint brief given to the US Army, 26 February 2005:                 
“Sea Enterprise: Right Force, Right Readiness, Right Cost”, delivered by Mr. Mark Honecker (N40). 
 
Figure 1.3 Department of Defense TOA (FY05 President’s Budget Request) 
 
c. The Navy Budget Perspective 
Figure 1.4 shows the Department of the Navy TOA (FY90-FY11) and 
how military/reserve personnel (MPN/RPN), operations, and investment funding have 
changed over the time period.  As such, the DON budget perspective for the period can 
be misleading.  Figure 1.4 illustrates the assumption that in the out-years there will be a 
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reduction in operating accounts, and an increase in acquisition accounts.  However, the 
Navy has typically experienced the opposite.    













































Source: Information derived from a PowerPoint brief given to the US Army, 26 February 2005:                 
“Sea Enterprise: Right Force, Right Readiness, Right Cost”, delivered by Mr. Mark Honecker (N40). 
 
Figure 1.4 Department of the Navy TOA 
 
d. Force Structure Trends 
Over the time spanning from FY90-FY03, the Navy force structure has 
experienced a 47% reduction in ships, and a 29% reduction in aircraft (Honecker, 2005).  
However, the Navy is in the process of transforming the fleet to become more adaptable, 
multi-mission capable and require less manpower.  Most of the planned purchases will 
occur in the surface combatant force.  As such, the Navy has planned to purchase of 50-
60 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and initially 4 DD(X) (Flight 0) ships.  Navy force 





































































Source: Information derived from a PowerPoint brief given to the US Army, 26 February 2005:                 
“Sea Enterprise: Right Force, Right Readiness, Right Cost”, delivered by Mr. Mark Honecker (N40). 
 
Figure 1.5 Force Structure Trends FY90-FY03: Ships and Aircraft 
 
The aging of the force structure also creates a concern.  Years of 
underinvestment in modernization and new acquisition has resulted in an aging force 
structure.  This state of affairs has resulted in an increase in operating costs.  For 
example, the average fixed wing aircraft age is 18 years, and the average ship age is 16 




e. Manpower Cost Trends 
The cost per person in the Navy has risen dramatically.  Since 1991, 
civilian manpower costs have increased 18.4% and military personnel costs have 
increased 21.7%, despite end strength reductions of 43% and 36% respectively.  Today, 
total manpower costs account for an astounding 65% of the Navy’s TOA (Nystrom, 
2005).   
 
3. What is the Department of the Navy Transforming From? 
The Department of the Navy is transforming from an Industrial-Age Navy and the 
organizational structures, processes, and culture that accompany it.  The desired result is 
a greater organizational capacity to respond to future changes in external circumstances.  
Additionally, the nature of the Navy organization as a public entity charged with 
maritime dominance presents its own unique barriers/challenges (Nystrom, 2005). 
 
4. What is the Department of the Navy Transforming To? 
Sea Power 21 provides the strategic framework to reshape the U.S. Naval force1.  
It is more than just a vision, it is about creating the flexibility the DON needs for an 
uncertain future.  The Sea Power 21 vision communicates to the Department the necessity 
for change and mastering its evolvement and sustainment, thus creating a stronger, more 
flexible, and more capable Navy.   
Three capabilities lie at the heart of Sea Power 21: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea 
Basing enabled by ForceNet.  Sea Strike is the ability to project precise and persistent 
offensive power from the sea; Sea Shield extends defensive assurance throughout the 
world; and Sea Basing enhances operational interdependence and support for the joint 
force.  These concepts build upon the solid foundation of the Navy-Marine Corps team, 
leverage U.S. asymmetric advantages, and strengthen joint combat effectiveness (Clark, 
2002). 
                                                 
1 Sea Power 21 was first introduced by the CNO, Admiral Vern Clark, at the Naval War College in 
Newport, Rhode Island in June 2002.  It was then formally introduced in the Naval Transformational 
Roadmap in 2003 per guidance set forth in the Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003. 
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Further, the enabling processes depicted in Figure 1.6 represent the delivery 
mechanisms of transformation.  Sea Trial is the vehicle for warfare innovation and 
technology development; Sea Warrior reflects the Navy’s commitment to the growth and 
development of people; and Sea Enterprise represents a recapitalization effort, where 
savings are the result of doing business better.  Although this thesis is focused mainly on 
Sea Enterprise, it is critical to understand that these three enabling processes are 
inextricably linked together – one cannot be successful without the other.    
 
Source:  http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno 
 
Figure 1.6 Sea Power 21 
 
Sea Enterprise is the cornerstone of the business revolution within the Department 
of the Navy.  The effort seeks to improve organizational alignment, refine requirements, 
and reinvest savings to buy the platforms and systems needed to transform the Navy.  
Drawing on lessons from the business revolution, Sea Enterprise will reduce overhead, 
streamline processes, substitute technology for manpower, and create incentives for 
positive change (Clark, 2002).  As such, Sea Enterprise has established initiatives to help 
identify savings throughout the Department of the Navy to recapitalize and modernize 
our Naval Force.   Perhaps  the  single most telling measure of success will be the Navy’s  
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collective willingness to harvest savings for recapitalization.  Also, in this thesis, 
initiatives are defined as efficiencies that reduce costs while providing the same or better 
levels of capability. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis aims to answer some basic questions regarding the ability of the U.S. 
Navy to realize savings as a result of Sea Enterprise initiatives.  It examines whether a 
culture has been created or exists that is capable of realizing savings.  Finally, this thesis 
will explore changes that could be implemented to accelerate the Sea Enterprise effort to 
realize savings, create a culture capable of saving, and transform and modernize the U.S. 
Naval force. 
1. Primary Questions 
The primary focus of this research is to answer the following questions: 
• Is the Department of the Navy realizing the savings forecasted for the 
various Sea Enterprise initiatives? 
• If savings are not being realized, are there identifiable challenges/issues 
with the effort? 
2. Secondary Questions 
In order to answer the primary questions there are several secondary questions to 
answer.  These questions include: 
• Has the DON created a culture capable of implementing these new  
business initiatives? 
• Is the DON capable of saving the money considering current structure, 
laws and policies and its incentive system? 
• What are some specific examples of implemented business practices that 
have proven successful in achieving the goals of Sea Enterprise?   
• What changes need to occur for successful implementation of the 
initiatives and savings to be realized?  That is, can Sea Enterprise get the 
law changed to facilitate savings needed for recapitalization? 
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C. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This thesis contributes to a greater awareness of the many difficulties and issues 
encountered in attempting to transform the United States Navy.  There are leadership, 
cultural, organizational structure, incentive and various other barriers to efficiency that 
must be overcome.  A clear understanding of these barriers is essential if transformation 
is to be achieved.  This thesis provides an analysis of the Sea Enterprise effort and the 
difficulties associated with becoming a more effective and efficient Naval force.   
It is important to understand that the purpose of this thesis is not to present a case 
study of Sea Enterprise.  Although this research endeavors to identify some specific 
examples of the successes of implemented business practices, its primary purpose is not 
to analyze and report on such successes.  Rather, the primary purpose of this thesis is to 
determine if the Department of the Navy has realized the savings forecasted for the 
various Sea Enterprise initiatives and to surface the various fundamental issues and 
challenges that may be associated with the effort.  As a result, this research aims to 
provide some recommendations for consideration to help accelerate the effort as a whole.  
Further, it establishes the groundwork for future researchers interested in helping to 
identify ways to operate in a more business-like manner; that is, conduct business better, 
faster, and cheaper.      
In addition to DOD guidance, testimonies, briefings, and a business literature 
review, the analysis provided here was based on several relevant sources, including 
interviews with CNO staff members (OPNAV N40, OPNAV N80), and other senior 
DON military and civilian personnel who have an interest in and a superior knowledge of 
the Navy’s “business.”  The results of this research are intended to provide greater 
awareness and knowledge of the journey ahead.  Further, this research intends to provide 
positive tangible benefit to the Department of the Navy as a reference to be consulted 
when exploring lessons learned and when deciding on future initiatives to transform, 





D. THESIS SCOPE 
The period of relevance for this thesis covers the current “life” of Sea Enterprise.  
Data collected spanned the approximate period of June 2002 through May 2005.  Based 
on expected Spring/Summer 2005 turnover of Sea Enterprise senior leadership2 there will 
be changes that occur in both policy and leadership responsibility.  Such changes are not 
considered in this thesis. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
A literature review of relevant business, leadership, and transformational topics 
was conducted.  Books, memorandums, briefs, testimonies, instructions, internet sites, 
magazine and journal articles, among others were reviewed.  A review of previous 
research conducted on cutback management was also undertaken.  Further, the detailed 
“process” of harvesting savings, to include a unifying definition of when savings are, in 
fact, considered realized savings, was identified and examined by the author.   
A series of personal interviews of high level military and civilian leaders was 
conducted.  In general, interviewees were initially contacted by email.  Through email 
correspondence, telephone interviews were scheduled.  Overall, approximately fourteen 
people were contacted for interviews.  However, some interviewees were contacted 
several times by telephone.  Additionally, some correspondences (after initial interviews 
were conducted) resulted in several (up to ten or fifteen in some cases) email exchanges 
with high level officials.  In all cases, respondents held elite and specialized positions 
with close ties to Sea Enterprise.  In all, more than 100 exchanges were made by email, 
telephone, and in person.  Finally, based on a thorough literature review and data 
collection, an analysis was conducted to evaluate the ability of the United States Navy to 
realize projected savings and how such efforts may have been affected by uniformity of 
effort, awareness, organizational culture, accountability, fiscal and organizational 
incentives (or disincentives), and leadership.   
 
                                                 
2 Senior leadership turnover is to include turnover of Admiral Vern Clark, who will be relieved by 
Admiral Michael Mullen as CNO this summer, 2005 (pending Congressional approval) and Mr. Pat 
Tamburrino (N8B and co-chair of the Corporate Business Council), who will be relieved by Ms. Mary Jo 
Decker in Spring 2005. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II provides a literature review to frame business concepts that are applied 
to the analysis of the Sea Enterprise effort.  Overall, the chapter provides background 
information to lay the foundation for the issues raised throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. With respect to the broad issue of the ability of the Department of the Navy to 
identify and realize savings, it is shown to be a highly complex matter.  As the issue is 
explored it is seen to be a highly interrelated mix of managerial issues such as 
organizational culture, leadership, execution and cutback management.  Such a mix 
requires careful examination in order to resolve the relevance and interdependencies 
among many of the important issues required for deep and sustained change; thus 
creating the transformation necessary to realize savings throughout the Department of the 
Navy.   
Chapter III provides a brief overview of the Sea Enterprise effort from its 
inception to the present.  The Sea Enterprise effort endeavors to foster innovation at the 
lowest level, increase productivity (that is, properly assign costs and measure output), 
maximize efficiency while maintaining effectiveness, and thus identify and realize 
savings in support of Sea Power 21.  A unique and dynamic set of goals and objectives, 
structures, responsibilities, and processes present a range of issues that can and do impact 
the effort as a whole. 
Chapter IV provides the analysis necessary to respond to the research questions 
raised previously in this chapter.  First, the “process” of realizing savings is identified to 
analyze the various identifiable obstacles to reaping harvested savings.  It is a course of 
action that requires communication, clarity of purpose, and consensus and perhaps most 
importantly, accountability and execution.  Second, the chapter presents an analysis of 
the Sea Enterprise effort to change the existing culture of command and control.  
Imbedded cultural norms make change management difficult within DON.  Third, 
leadership involvement in the overall effort is discussed.  Then, under the management 
umbrella of leadership, some examples of short-term wins are identified as a result of 
implemented business practices.   
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Chapter V presents a series of conclusions and recommendations based on the 
research and analysis conducted.  A number of important Sea Enterprise related process, 
culture, and leadership issues are summarized.  Further, recommendations are made for 
top level Navy leadership to help establish equal footing across the enterprise, a clarity of 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides background information on a number of subject areas in 
order to lay the foundation for topics raised throughout the remainder of this thesis.  As a 
result of this literature review, a context is created for the analysis of the Sea Enterprise 
effort.  The aim of the Sea Enterprise effort is to operate the Department of the Navy in a 
more business-like manner to become more efficient and maximize its resources.  The 
following subject matter will help frame business, public service, and management 
concepts that can be applied to the Department of the Navy’s endeavors. 
This chapter begins by discussing the cultivation of organizational culture.  
Studies prove that the root of behavior and success within an organization stem from the 
culture created by its leaders.  The guidance cited spans a substantial period supported by 
experts in the field of organizational culture and change. 
The leadership role in an organization is discussed next.  In addition, some past 
errors made by leaders in corporate America have contributed to the development of a 
framework to influence change within an organization.  Similarly, challenges that 
government leaders face are applicable to and can be related to challenges faced in 
corporate America.    
A discussion of the importance of execution within all organizations is then 
presented.  In the past, it was assumed that organizations with the best strategies and 
clearly articulated visions were the most successful.  In fact, even organizations that were 
considered to have the most experienced leadership and the “right” strategy were failing.  
This section further explains that execution was the missing, yet essential variable. 
Finally, a section which summarizes the concept of cutback management is 
included in this chapter.  Numerous initiatives throughout the years have been attempted 
to help the government identify inefficiencies.  Management of retrenchment is one 
approach that is described. 
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B. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Despite efforts to incorporate business concepts in the Department of the Navy to 
optimize efficiency, results will not be realized unless a culture is created to embrace the 
initiatives.  A positive organizational culture reinforces the core beliefs and behaviors 
that a leader desires while weakening the values and actions the leader rejects.  A 
negative culture becomes toxic, poisoning the life of the organization and hindering any 
future potential for growth and/or change.   
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld frequently discusses his vision to “transform” the 
Department of Defense.  In general, transformation is an appealing concept that results in 
restructuring personnel, programs and processes.  However, in reality, organizations are 
filled with old cultural norms, which make new and innovative ideas difficult to embrace 
(Bertrand, 2002).  This situation is especially true in the defense environment where 
traditions and customs are important to mission accomplishment.  Thus, transformation 
becomes a major undertaking that comes at a high price.  But when it is implemented and 
embraced, the benefits can surpass the painstaking costs.  The following paragraphs will 
discuss the importance of understanding what ‘culture’ is and identify theories that help 
support the transformation of culture. 
 
1. Culture 
The culture of an organization speaks of the values, beliefs, and behaviors that are 
shared by the members of the organization.  While no organization has a pure culture 
throughout, every successful organization has a core culture (Schneider, 1998).  The core 
culture is the central functioning of the organization, which shapes how the organization 
behaves and operates in order to succeed.  It is critical that this core or lead culture is 
aligned with the organization’s strategy and core leadership practices (Schneider, 1998).  
This alignment is central to any organization’s effectiveness including that of the 
Department of the Navy.   
Although we grow up and live in a particular culture, it is also something that we 
acquire (or learn) over time.  According to research conducted by Bill Schneider, there 
are four core cultures: control, collaboration, competence and cultivation.  It is important 
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to realize that leaders create one of these four cultures within their organizations.  This is 
especially relevant to the Department of Defense as culture is created by top-down 
leadership within a bureaucratic framework.  The four core cultures emerge from the 
following social archetypes: 
• Control: military system; power motive. 
• Collaboration: family and/or athletic team system; affiliation motive. 
• Competence: university system; achievement motive. 
• Cultivation: religious system(s); growth, or self actualization, motive. 
There is a strong connection between strategy, culture, and leadership (Schneider, 1998).  
These fundamental connections are shown in Table 2.1 below: 
 
   Culture  Strategy  Leadership 
   Control Market share  dominance  
Commodity or Commodity-like  









Collaboration Synergistic customer relationship 
Close partnership with customer  
High customization  
Total solution for customer  
Incremental, step-by-step, 
relationship with customer 
Team Builder  
First among equals  
Coach  
Participative  
Trust builder  
Integrator 
Competence Distinction  
Excellence  
Extremely unique  
One-of-kind offering  
Create market niche  
Constant innovation to stay ahead 
Typically, carriage trade markets 
Standard setter  
Conceptual visionary  
Taskmaster  
Assertive  
Convincing persuader  
Challenger of others 
Cultivation Growth of customer  
Fuller realization of potential  
Enrichment of customer  
Raise the human spirit  
Further realization of ideals, 




Commitment builder  
Steward  
Appeal to higher-level vision 
Source: William E. Schneider, Ph.D.  The CEO Refresher: Why Good Management Ideas Fail – The Neglected Power 
of Organizational Culture (May-June, 1998).  Available: http://www.refresher.com/!neglected.  Accessed: 29 Jan 2005. 
 
Table 2.1 Strategy, Culture and Leadership Connections 
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Although the Department of Defense clearly falls under the control archetype, it is 
beneficial to discuss all four archetypes as a comparative analysis. 
 
a. Control 
The basis for the control culture is certainty.  It fundamentally exists to 
ensure certainty, predictability, safety, accuracy, and dependability (Schneider, 1998).  
The organization as a system comes first.  Accordingly, the design and framework for 
information and knowledge in the control culture is built essentially around the goals of 
the organization, and the extent to which those goals are met.  This culture is centered on 
organizational goal attainment.  That is, mission accomplishment takes priority (as it 
should), however it is accomplished at all costs, not necessarily at the right cost, or in the 
most efficient manner.  This behavior undeniably resembles the culture that has been 
spawned from our predecessors who have praised status quo.  The ideology of a culture 




The basis for the collaboration culture is synergy.  It fundamentally exists 
to ensure unity, close connection with the customer, and intense dedication to the 
customer.  The organization moves ahead through the diverse collective experience of 
people from inside and outside the organization.  This culture is centered on unique 
customer goal attainment (Schneider, 1998).   
The Department of the Navy does not work collaboratively as it is 
suggested here.  Showing organizations how to see themselves as collaborative systems 
requires leadership—conscious oversight that can create a sense of organizational 
cohesiveness and shared vision.  Such leadership breaks down the hierarchy and creates a 
more flat organization in which goals and a newly defined belief system are shared 





The basis for the competence culture is distinction.  It fundamentally 
exists to ensure the accomplishment of unparalleled, unmatched products or services 
(Schneider, 1987).  This is the culture of uniqueness per se, of one-of-a-kind products or 
services.  In a competence culture, the realization of conceptual goals, particularly 
superior, distinctive conceptual goals thrive.  The framework for information and 
knowledge is built around the conceptual system goals of the organization and the extent 
to which those goals are met.  This culture is centered on conceptual goal attainment.  
Competence more appropriately describes the culture of a technology firm such as Intel 
and Bell Labs (Lucent Technologies) where innovation and superior products are the 
company’s competitive advantage. 
 
d. Cultivation 
The basis for the cultivation culture is enrichment.  It fundamentally exists 
to ensure the fullest growth of the customer, fulfillment of the customer’s potential, and 
the raising up of the customer.  This culture is all about the further realization of ideals, 
values, and higher order purposes.  The key emphasis in this culture is the connection 
between what is espoused and what is put into operation.  This culture is focused on 
value-centered goal attainment (Schneider, 1987).  This culture also addresses a topic not 
taken into enough consideration; the gap between strategy and execution.   
While not denying the appropriateness of bureaucratic control for some 
situations, the success of Sea Enterprise and Sea Power 21 is in part predicated on the 
removal/redesign of traditional control systems in our appraisals, rewards, promotion, 
and incentives that are bureaucratic in manner, and inflexible to differing conditions 
(Nystrom, 2005).  Therefore, top level Navy leadership should consider the values, 
beliefs, and behaviors of other core cultures that would help best achieve desired actions 





2. Strategies for Effecting Cultural Change  
"Changing the culture of any organization is not easy. Changing the culture of an 
institution as large, complex, and deeply rooted as the U.S. military, would be extremely 
difficult.  Rather than seeking to change the culture of the services directly, advocates of 
change may want to innovate within existing cultures or foster new ones that are more 
supportive of change (Mahnken, 2004)".  
It is an important distinction to make between changing the entire culture directly 
and fostering a new culture that will be more supportive of a new way of thinking.  
Changing a culture, altering behaviors and attitudes, does not necessarily result in 
changing everything an organization does, but rather changes the way it thinks about 
what it does and how it does it.  E.H. Schein, a leading theorist on organizational culture, 
through years of research has developed some proven strategies for effecting cultural 
change.  These strategies are outlined below (Schein, 1999): 
• Unfreezing the old culture and creating motivation to change. 
• Capitalizing on propitious (benevolent) moments - problems, 
opportunities, changed circumstances, and/or accumulated 
excesses or deficiencies of the past. 
• Making the change target concrete and clear. 
• Maintaining some continuity with the past. 
• Creating psychological safety through a compelling positive 
vision, formal training, informal training of relevant groups and 
teams, providing coaches and positive role models, employee 
involvement and opportunities for input and feedback, support 
groups, and addressing fears and losses head on. 
• Selecting, modifying, and creating appropriate cultural forms, 
behaviors, artifacts, and socialization tactics. 
• Cultivating charismatic leaders. 
• Having a realistic and solid transition plan. 
• Exercising risk management by understanding and addressing 
the risks and the benefits as well as the potential inequitable 
distribution of these risks and benefits. 
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Careful consideration of these change strategies may help foster the culture 
necessary to invoke change.    
The culture of any organization is formulated and impacted by several variables.  
Perhaps the most prominent and obvious variable is the leader of the organization.  All 
things flow from the lead.  Larry Bossidy, chairman and former CEO of Honeywell 
International and a well-renown author, states “success in executing a cultural change 
depends first and foremost on having the right people (Bossidy and Charan, 2002).”  That 
is, the values of the leader of any organization are reflected in the culture of the 
organization.  As such, it is logical to discuss next leadership’s role in the transformation 
effort in an organization. 
 
C. LEADERSHIP 
Large-scale organizational transformation is, at best, a developing art that has yet 
to produce any clear formulas for success, but more and more attention is being turned to 
senior leadership as the principle agents of change and adaptation.  Within the 
Department of Defense there have been many efforts to effect change that have carried 
several different titles to include Total Quality Management and down-sizing (right-
sizing).  The following paragraphs provide a fresh look at leadership and how leaders can 
instill change throughout a large organization. 
 
1. Leadership at All Levels 
There must be a sense of conviction and energy of the overall vision of the Navy 
at every level of the organization.  This level of commitment has been created at such 
large corporations as General Electric, as indicated in the below quote.  This kind of 
innovative thinking must be infused into the entire Naval workforce to ensure long-term 
survival in an ever-changing environment.   
We never shut up about the great things that lie ahead of a company whose 
people get up every morning and come to work knowing—convinced—
that there is a better way of doing everything they do—and determined to 
find out who knows that way and how they can learn it.   
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It is this learning, sharing, and action-driven culture, when laid across the 
diverse businesses of GE, that gives us our true advantage, an advantage 
single-industry companies can never match—what we call “horizontal 
learning” across more than 250 diverse, global GE business segments.3 
John P. Kotter has been widely cited in his research regarding leadership and 
management.  He found that the management functions – coping with complexity, 
planning and budgeting, organizing and staffing, and controlling and problem-solving – 
were needed, but not a substitute for leadership functions – coping with change, setting 
direction, aligning people, motivating and inspiring (Cohen, 2002).  Management is about 
making the status quo function well (e.g., getting the sailors to morning quarters on time), 
while leadership is about conceiving, inspiring, and initiating change (e.g., creating a 
culture incentivized to save rather than spend).  The distinction between management and 
leadership is an important one, especially when considering the involvement of 
leadership at each level in the chain of command necessary to realize the goals set forth 
by Sea Enterprise. 
The kind of determination that is required to keep finding new and better ways of 
conducting business that has characterized General Electric and a few other large 
corporations is necessary at all levels of the organization.  Leaders cannot merely manage 
from the top, but must be involved in all kinds of jobs, constantly examining execution 
and performance-based metrics.   Further, these results should initiate the development of 
improvements to already achieved efficiencies.  Leadership must continue to seek better 
ways of doing business; do more with less and attempt to stay ahead of the ever-changing 
environment. 
It is impossible for top level leadership to know everything considering the rapid 
advancements in technology and associated applications, the nuances of the workforce, 
and the overall attitude of the workforce.  Therefore, the top level leader must rely 
heavily on leadership throughout the organization to contribute to fostering a culture for 
change and motivating sailors on an everyday basis.  Infusing initiative – and the capacity 
to develop and deliver on it – is not however, easily accomplished.  Not all individuals 
have the drive or know-how to deliver effective initiative, and not all organizational 
                                                 
3 General Electric Annual Report, 1996; abstracted from Cohen, 2002. 
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practices and procedures encourage it.4  Even when the talent exists, many organizations 
do things that serve to actively discourage effective initiative, for a host of reasons 
(Cohen, 2002).  One significant reason this may be true within the Department of the 
Navy is the bureaucratic manner in which it operates. 
 
2. Conquering Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy was developed to solve the problem of how to get work done by 
people who might not have the skills, experience, motivation, or training to make wide-
ranging decisions, but who could do work that was carefully prescribed and 
circumscribed (Cohen, 2002).  By limiting the scope of latitude through defined 
positions, rules, and procedures, organizations could leverage the talents of those few at 
the top who had demonstrated their wisdom (or could deliver to a governing body’s 
specifications). The structure and tradition serves to enable diverse units to coordinate 
their work according to allocated powers.  It also allows scaling up to a very large size 
when that is necessary.  No better way to accomplish work in stable environments has 
ever been developed.  In fact, that is why Kotter refers to “managing” as a necessary 
component of dealing with complexity (Kotter, 1990).   
However, in a changing world (to include more sophisticated technologies and 
increased capabilities of U.S. adversaries who are highly mobile and unpredictable) with 
high uncertainty and unpredictability, traditional organizations and processes are too slow 
for many necessary activities.  Bureaucracy, when executed well, can add value, yet may 
constrain needed components of the organization (Cohen, 2002).  Thus, the commitment 
of leadership to developing and sustaining corporate innovation has the potential to help 
transform organizations and unleash talent.   
 
3. Change Management 
In the change process, it is critical to identify what an organization is changing 
from and then, what it is changing to.  Therefore, the initial organizational diagnosis is a 
critical precursor to the next step: the development of a change strategy.  John P. Kotter 
                                                 
4 This phenomenon is being addressed through implementation of the Navy’s Human Capital Strategy. 
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introduces some ideas of leading change drawn from conferences involving highly visible 
scholars and consultants.  His findings represent a wide range of disciplines from 
psychiatry to social psychology and economics.   
The most general lesson to be learned from the more successful cases in corporate 
America is that the change process goes through a series of phases that, in total, usually 
require a considerable amount of time.  Skipping steps creates only the illusion of speed 
and not the long-term effect leadership desires.  A second lesson is that critical mistakes 
in any phase can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum and negating hard-won 
gains (Kotter, 1988).  Oftentimes, organizations make an error (or errors) throughout the 
change process that inhibits expected or desired results.  The following paragraphs will 
summarize some errors commonly made in making fundamental changes in how business 
is conducted in order to help cope with a new, more challenging market environment 
which, as one will see, is synonymous with achieving greater efficiency within the 
Department of the Navy. 
 
a. Not Establishing Enough Sense of Urgency 
Most successful change efforts begin when certain individuals or groups 
start to look hard at a company’s competitive situation, market position, technological 
trends, and financial performance (Kotter, 1988).  That is, organizations typically develop 
transformation strategies when the competitive environment is evolving at a faster rate 
than the organization is.  Organizational leaders then find ways to communicate the 
crisis, potential crisis, or great opportunity.  The first step in the transformational process 
is a critical one because it requires the aggressive cooperation of many individuals.  
Without top-level motivation and buy-in, people won’t help and the effort will never 
leave the ground. 
Compared to other steps in the change process, step one may appear to be 
easy.  However, it is not.  “Well over 50 percent of the companies I watched fail in this 
first phase.  Sometimes executives underestimate how hard it can be to drive people out 
of their comfort zones.  Sometimes they grossly overestimate how successful they have 
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been already been in increasing organizational urgency.  In many cases executives 
become paralyzed by the down-side possibilities [of change] (Kotter, 1990).”   
A “paralyzed” senior management team often results from too many 
managers and not enough leaders.  Management’s mandate is to minimize risk and keep 
the current system operating.  That is, transformation requires leaders to manage both 
current and future readiness.  Leaders must incur some level of risk in the present to 
realize change in the future.  Phase one in a renewal process typically goes nowhere until 
enough real leaders are promoted and hired into senior-level jobs (Kotter, 1990).   
Transformations often begin, and begin well, when an organization has a 
new head who is a good leader who sees the need for major change.  If the renewal target 
is the entire organization, then the CEO is key.  The purpose of all this activity, in the 
words of one former CEO of a large European company, is “to make the status quo seem 
more dangerous than launching into the unknown (Kotter, 1990).” 
So then, when is the urgency rate high enough?  It has been determined 
through many studies that when about 75 percent of the organization’s management is 
honestly convinced that business as usual is totally unacceptable, it can be determined 
that urgency is high enough.  Anything less can produce very serious problems later on in 
the process.   
 
b. Not Creating a Powerful Guiding Coalition 
Major renewal programs often start with just one or two people.  In cases 
of successful transformation efforts, the leadership coalition grows over time.  But 
whenever some minimum mass is not achieved early in the effort, nothing much 
worthwhile happens (Kotter, 1990).   
Creating a coalition within the Navy requires the CNO to determine which 
of his senior leaders are committed to increased efficiency through renewal.  This group 
does  not  need  to include all of the Navy’s top leadership because some simply will not  
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buy in, at least not at first.  But in the most successful cases, the coalition is always pretty 
powerful in terms of titles, information and expertise, reputations, and relationships 
(Kotter, 1990). 
Since the guiding coalition includes members who are not part of senior 
management, by definition, it tends to operate within and without the normal hierarchy.  
Although not typical, it is clearly necessary to penetrate into other layers of leadership in 
order to be successful.  If the existing hierarchy were working well, there would be no 
need for a major transformation.  But if the current system is not working, reform 
generally demands outside activity (buy in) outside of formal boundaries, expectations, 
and protocol (Kotter, 1990).  This may be a difficult realization for the Navy, but 
necessary nonetheless. 
Incorporating phase one, a high sense of urgency within the managerial 
ranks is essential to forming a guiding coalition.  Someone must continue to 
communicate with other managers, identify problems and opportunities, and create a 
minimum level of trust.  Off-site retreats for two or three days are one popular vehicle for 
accomplishing this task.  GE has embraced this idea and has found it to be instrumental in 
its successes. 
Organizations that fail in creating a guiding coalition typically 
underestimate the need for a guiding coalition in effecting change.  No matter how 
capable or dedicated the staff head, groups without strong line leadership never achieve 
the power that is required.  In such cases, the opposition (those senior level managers that 
do not buy in) will unite and change will slow down and eventually come to a halt.   
 
c. Lacking a Vision 
Successful transformations involve a guiding coalition development of a 
picture of the future that is relatively easy to communicate and appeals to customers, 
stakeholders and employees.   A vision says something that helps clarify the direction in 
which an organization needs to move (Kotter, 1990).  The first draft is typically written 
by a single individual.  Although a bit blurry at first, the guiding coalition will reshape 
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and work on it for an extensive period of time.  Through tough analytical thinking and 
maybe a little dreaming, a more clear and focused vision emerges.  Eventually, a strategy 
to achieve the vision is developed. 
Without a sensible vision, the multiple change efforts within the 
organization could become confusing and incompatible to change.  For example, without 
the Navy clearly identifying what end state is desired, the Human Capital Strategy, 360-
degree feedback program, and Sea Enterprise for that matter, will not add up in a 
meaningful way. 
Policies, goals, methods, and deadlines can become mind-numbing 
without a clear sense of vision.  Hundreds of pages of paperwork describing the change 
effort will cause confusion and a sense of alienation among employees.  The thick 
documents do not rally change or promote buy in; in fact, quite the opposite is most often 
the case.  Kotter has a useful rule of thumb, which is, if you can’t communicate the vision 
to someone in five minutes or less and get a reaction that signifies both understanding 
and interest, you are not yet done with this phase of the transformation process (Kotter, 
1990). 
 
d. Under-communicating the Vision by a Factor of Ten 
There are three patterns that are most common in change strategy.  All 
three patterns describe how vision is often either under-communicated or mis-
communicated.  In the first example, a group actually does develop a pretty good 
transformation vision and then proceeds to communicate it by holding a single meeting or 
sending out a single communication.  Having used about .0001 percent of the yearly 
intra-company communication, the senior level group is startled that few people seem to 
understand the new approach (Kotter, 1990).  In this case, the vision is under-
communicated, and therefore change will not be executed by employees.  In the second 
example, the head of the organization spends a considerable amount of time making 
speeches to employee groups, but most people still do not get it.  In this case, an attempt 
was made to deliver the vision, but it obviously still lacks clarity for employee 
understanding and buy in.  In the third example, much more effort goes into newsletters 
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and speeches, but some very visible senior executives still behave in ways antithetical to 
the vision.  The net result in this case is that cynicism among the troops goes up while 
belief in the communication goes down (Kotter, 1990).  This reemphasizes the 
importance of creating a guiding coalition with a belief in the vision. 
Transformation is possible only when hundreds or thousands of people 
(depending on the size of the organization) are willing to help.  In many cases, these 
people will need to make short-term sacrifices.  That is, even if people are unhappy with 
the status quo, they will be unwilling to help if they do not believe in the organization’s 
vision.  Therefore, without a significant amount of credible communication, the hearts 
and minds of the employees will not be captured (Kotter, 1990). 
Executives who communicate well incorporate messages of the 
organization’s vision during performance appraisals.  In the review of a division’s 
quarterly performance (such as the CNO’s Echelon II Reviews to be discussed in Chapter 
III), they not only talk about the numbers, but how those numbers and other efforts made 
by the division can be translated into renewal goals (transformation efforts). 
In successful transformation efforts, the vision is communicated across a 
broad spectrum of distribution channels.  Boring and unread newsletters are turned into 
lively readings flaunting new initiatives and success stories throughout the organization.  
The vision is further communicated through executive education that focuses on business 
problems and methodologies and the new vision.   Also, the vision can be communicated 
in the form of individual or unit awards.  Being recognized for outstanding results as a 
reflection of commitment to the vision (thus, change strategy) can communicate to others 
the importance of the initiative and the recognition it is getting from top level 
management.  The guiding principle is: use every possible channel, especially those that 
are being wasted on nonessential information (Kotter, 1990). 
Perhaps most importantly, senior level management must learn to “walk 
the talk.”  They must consciously attempt to become a living symbol of the new corporate 
culture (Kotter, 1990).  In many large and bureaucratic organizations, people become 
very set in their ways.  However, when the vision is clearly understood and strategy 
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adopted, such a change is possible.  A high level of urgency aids this process, as well as 
being part of a guiding coalition.  It is through this guiding coalition and continuous 
communication of the vision that desired behaviors are reinforced.  This positively effects 
change in peers and subordinates alike. 
Communication comes in both words and deeds, and the latter are most 
often the most powerful form.  Nothing undermines change more than behavior by 
important individuals that is inconsistent with their words (Kotter, 1990). 
 
e. Not Removing Obstacles to the New Vision 
Successful transformations begin to involve large numbers of people as 
the process progresses.  More employees become involved in developing new processes, 
approaches or ideas for change.  Additionally, they provide leadership to others to foster 
a culture of change within their own purview.  The more people involved, the better the 
outcome. 
  Within the guiding coalition, effective communication of the vision could 
result in positive action by other employees.  However, communication alone is not 
sufficient.  Transformation also requires the removal of barriers to change.  That is, ideas, 
organizational structures, policies, status quo, among other things create barriers to 
change.  Sometimes these barriers reside in the head of the employee, however it is the 
responsibility of management to convince the employee that their external barriers do not 
exist and to remove them if they do exist.  Unfortunately, and in most cases, the barriers 
are very real. 
  There are many examples of barriers to change.  Sometimes the barrier is 
the organizational structure: narrow job categories can seriously undermine efforts to 
increase efficiency or innovation at the lower levels of the organization.  Sometimes 
compensation or performance-appraisal systems make people choose between the new 
vision and their own self-interests (Kotter, 1990).  That is, in the context of the Navy, 
self-interested thoughts include “who signs my Fitrep” and “what do I need to do to get 
promoted?”  If acting, leading and communicating in support of the new vision is not a 
factor in the performance evaluation, then lower level leaders will be more apt to act in 
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their own self-interests.  Perhaps the worst example of all is a boss who refuses to change 
and who makes demands that are inconsistent with the overall effort (Kotter, 1990). 
  In the first half of a transformation, no organization has the momentum, 
power or time to get rid of all barriers (Kotter, 1990).  However, the big and tangible ones 
must be addressed and removed.  Action is essential to ensure others feel empowered to 
create change and to maintain credibility amongst employees that management is 
dedicated to the change effort. 
 
f. Not Systematically Planning and Creating Short-Term Wins 
Real transformation takes time, and a renewal effort risks losing 
momentum if there are no short-term goals to meet and celebrate (Kotter, 1990).  Without 
short-term wins, too many people give up too soon and join the ranks of those resisting 
change.  Short-term wins or gains give those dedicated to transformation tangible results 
of their own efforts, thus creating a greater following and innovation throughout the 
workplace. 
Creating short-term wins is different than hoping for short-term wins.  In a 
successful transformation, managers actively look for ways to obtain clear performance 
improvements; that is, establish goals in the yearly planning system, achieve the 
objectives, and reward the people involved with recognition, promotions, and even 
money.   Short-term wins with respect to the Navy’s transformational efforts are further 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
Managers often complain about being forced to create short-term wins, but 
studies have shown that pressure can be a useful element in a change effort (Kotter, 
1990).  It is important to keep short-term gains as part of the overall strategy because 
when people realize that change will take a long time, interest level drops.  Therefore, 
commitment to short-term gains keeps the urgency level up and forces analytical thinking 




g. Declaring Victory Too Soon 
Although celebrating a short-term win is fine, declaring a victory too soon 
can be catastrophic.  In the early stages, new approaches are fragile and can break easily.  
Large changes such as an organization’s culture may take five to ten years (or more) to 
realize (Kotter, 1990).   
Typically, problems arise in the early phases: the urgency level is not 
intense enough, the guiding coalition is not powerful enough, and the vision is not clear 
enough.  But it is the premature declaration of victory that halts the momentum (Kotter, 
1990).  Then, the powerful forces associated with tradition (status quo) take over. 
Instead of declaring victory, leaders of successful efforts use the 
credibility afforded by short-term wins to tackle even bigger problems (Kotter, 1990).  
Structures and systems that are not in keeping with the plans for change are attacked.  
New approaches and developments larger than the initial efforts are formed.  Leadership 
also realizes that change will take years and not months.  Therefore, short-term wins are 
used as a vehicle for motivation and recognition, and must not be confused with declaring 
the war won. 
 
h. Not Anchoring Changes in the Corporation’s Culture 
Change strategies must become deeply rooted in an organization’s culture.  
In the final analysis, when the original change strategies are referred to as “the way we do 
things around here”, it can assured that the change will stick.  Until new behaviors are 
rooted in social norms and shared values, they are subject to degradation as soon as the 
pressure is removed (Kotter, 1990).  However, it is important that ‘flexible anchoring’ 
occur within an organization.  If a culture is not flexible to continuous change then status 
quo can be reestablished.   
Two factors are particularly influential in institutionalizing change in 
corporate culture.  The first is a conscious attempt to show people how the new 
approaches, behaviors, and attitudes have helped improve performance (Kotter, 1990).  
Communication is paramount in showing employees how their individual efforts have 
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increased overall performance (and in the case of the Navy, the implementation of Sea 
Enterprise initiatives that may lead to efficiencies).  The second factor is taking sufficient 
time to make sure that the next generation of top management really does personify the 
new approach (Kotter, 1990).5  One bad succession decision at the top of an organization 
can undermine perhaps years of work.  In the most successful cases, the champion of 
change was the retiring executive (Kotter, 1990).   
The above paragraphs outline the most commonly made errors that lead to 
ineffective or short-lived change.  There are still more mistakes that organizations and 
leadership alike can make, but these eight are the most prominent.  Table 2.2 (next page) 








                                                 
5 A similar question is valid in the U.S. Navy with the relief of the CNO (summer 2005) drawing near. 
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1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
• Examining market and competitive realities 
• Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities 
2. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition 
• Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change effort 
• Encouraging the group to work together as a team 
3. Creating a Vision 
• Creating a Vision to help direct the change effort 
• Developing strategies for achieving that vision 
4. Communication the Vision 
• Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies 
• Teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition 
5. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision 
• Getting rid of obstacles to change 
• Changing systems or structures that seriously undermine the vision 
• Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions 
6. Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins 
• Planning for visible performance improvements 
• Creating those improvements 
• Recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the improvements 
7. Consolidation Improvements and Producing Still More Change 
• Using increased credibility to change systems, structures, and policies that don’t 
fit the vision 
• Hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can implement the vision 
• Reinvigorating the process with the new projects, themes, and change agents 
8. Institutionalizing New Approaches 
• Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and corporate success 
• Developing the means to ensure leadership development and succession 
 
Source: John P. Kotter’s Leading Change in The Leader’s Change Handbook, 1999. 
 





4. Shift in Leadership Traits 
A traditional view of leadership is based on the belief that people must be coerced 
into working because they would not choose to do so of their own free will.  Another 
view is based on the growing belief that the Navy provides the means for development, 
personal growth and self-actualization; therefore, people will be intrinsically motivated to 
perform the tasks requested of them (Nystrom, 2005).  People within the Navy are 
changing and evolving, and so too is the art of “getting things done.”  The leader must 
evolve with the people who are more educated, capable, and valuable.  As the traits of the 
people change, the leadership traits must also change.  Table 2.3 below summarizes the 
shift in leadership traits. 
 
Old Expectations of Leaders New Expectations of Leaders 
1. Get results by directing people and 
getting compliance 
2. Create strong followers who respect 
authority 
3. Get people to follow policy and 
procedure 
                                                                     
4. Develop individual strengths within 
department 
5. Implement orders for the above (in the 
organization) 
6. Be responsible for the actions of the 
work unit 
7. Be excellent at the technical work 
performed in the department 
8. Control people to produce the highest 
possible output 
1. Get results by involving people and 
getting commitment 
2. Encourage people to think, to initiate, to 
develop autonomy 
3. Get people to respond to changing 
situations in ways that are consistent with 
stated values and expectations 
4. Develop strengths within and across 
work teams 
5. Accept responsibility for their own 
leadership 
6. Be responsive to the needs of the work 
unit 
7. Be excellent at the interpersonal aspects 
of the work unit 
8. Empower people to produce the highest 
possible output 
Source: “360-Degree Feedback: A Powerful Tool for Leadership Development and Performance 
Appraisal”, by CDR David C. Nystrom; abstracted from: Pasmore, William. Designing Effective 
Organizations: The Sociotechnical Systems Perspective.  John Wiley and Sons; New York, NY, 1988 
 




It recent years, even large organizations with clearly articulated visions and 
strategies have failed.  Brilliant CEOs with break-through ideas have failed.  In some 
instances, innovative and ground-breaking technology never saw the light of day.  A 
common thread of these failures is a lack of execution.  As a large organization 
attempting to effect transformational efforts throughout its department, the United States 
Navy must learn from the mistakes made by other large organizations (public or private).  
As articulated in the book titled “Execution” by Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan, 
execution is:  
1. The missing link. 
2. The main reason companies fall short of their promises. 
3. The gap between what a company’s leaders want to achieve and the ability 
of their organizations to deliver it. 
4. Not simply tactics, but a system of getting things done through 
questioning, analysis, and follow-through.  A discipline for meshing 
strategy with reality, aligning people with goals, and achieving the results 
promised. 
5. A central part of a company’s strategy and its goals and the major job of 
any leaders in business.  
6. A discipline requiring a comprehensive understanding of a business, its 
people, and its environment. 
7. The way to link the three core processes of any business – the people 
process, the strategy, and the operating plan – together to get things done 
on time. 
Sea Enterprise will never be considered more than a bright idea unless it is 
properly executed.  Without execution, the breakthrough thinking breaks down; learning 
adds no value; people do not meet their stretch goals; and the revolution stops dead in its 
tracks.  What you get is change for the worse, because failure drains the energy from your 
organization.  Repeated failure destroys it (Bossidy and Charan).   
 There must be dedication to execution at all levels.  The United States Navy will 
not  be  able  to  deliver  on  its  commitments  or  adapt well to change unless a powerful  
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guiding coalition practices the discipline of execution.  Just as the leader has to be 
personally involved in execution, so must everyone else in the organization understand 
and practice the discipline.   
Earlier in this chapter, it was stated that “results will not be realized unless a 
culture is created to embrace the initiatives [of Sea Enterprise].”  Even further, execution 
must become a part of a organization’s culture in order to realize results.  Making 
changes in strategy or structure is not enough.  However, when adopted within the culture 
of an organization, execution can help realize sustainable change.  That is, quite simply, 
the United States Navy must create a culture of execution. 
 
1. Creating a Framework for Cultural Change Through Execution 
Bossidy and Charan have conducted dozens of studies on both the successes and 
failures of organizations and their CEOs.  In such studies, it was determined that to 
change an organization’s culture, the organization requires a set of processes – social 
operating mechanisms- that will change the beliefs and the behavior of people in ways 
that are directly linked to bottom-line results (Bossidy and Charan).  As such, the authors 
devised a reality-based framework for cultural change that creates and reinforces a 
discipline of execution.  The approach is practical and completely linked to measurable 
results. 
The basic premise of the approach is that cultural change gets real when your aim 
is execution (Bossidy and Charan).  It is fairly simple in nature, and yet few organizations 
utilize the approach.  Leadership must change the people’s behavior in order to produce 
results.  Therefore, leadership must first clearly communicate what results are desired.  
Then, there must be a discussion that involves how to get the desired results; a key 
element to coaching.  When results are realized, leadership must reward its people for 
producing desired results.  If results are less than desirable, then leadership must provide 
additional coaching, withdraw rewards, or find someone else more capable of 
accomplishing the tasks.  When these actions are taken, a culture of execution is created. 
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The key theme in the approach articulated above is accountability.  
Accountability starts with one or two people, usually the CEO and possibly one other 
person.  Practicing the right behavior (the behavior that is expected of the organization’s 
people) starts with the leader of the organization, the champion of change.  Once 
behavior in the leader has changed, it is then logical to ask, “After the leader changes, 
what is to be done next?"  The answer is, “Communicate it to six hundred fifty thousand 
people.”  That is, communicate it to the entire enterprise, the United States Navy.6  Then 
it might be asked, “How would that make anyone change?”  It won’t by itself, but 
holding oneself accountable at the very top is a good start.  The leader must then 
communicate with a top level group of managers.  Once this group of managers holds 
themselves accountable, the next phase is to hold their direct reports accountable, and so 
on.  The manner in which each echelon is held accountable can be left at the discretion of 
the manager.  Through strict enforcement of accountability, an organization should have 
follow-through, feedback, and rewards tied into individual performance and behavior at 
all levels.    
A good, clear strategy is necessary for success, but not sufficient for survival 
(Charan, 1999).  CEOs have been fascinated with the development and communication of 
the “right” strategy and a clear vision for the past decade or so.  It has been considered 
the key to “blow away” competitors.  In reality, that’s less than half the battle (Charan, 
1999).  Execution has the power to change an organization’s corporate DNA (corporate 
culture).  However, different from that of human DNA, corporate DNA can evolve and 
change.   
 
E. CUTBACK MANAGEMENT 
The quest for efficiency is not new to the Department of Defense.  Numerous 
initiatives throughout the years have been attempted to help identify inefficiencies, 
reduce costs, and cut the fat off the top line.  Cutback management is yet another concept 
to help the government maximize its use of resources.  Cutback management is the term 
which has been coined to apply to the management of tradeoffs, re-allocations, 
                                                 
6 The United States Navy has an approximate military and civilian end-strength of 642,766. 
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organizational contractions, program terminations, sacrifice, and reduction of benefits 
previously felt to be irrevocable (Cox, 1986).  Sea Enterprise focuses on identifying and 
eliminating non-core functions that unnecessarily compete for resources.  Similarly, 
cutback management is a means of managing organizational change toward levels of 
resource consumption (Cox, 1986). 
Four aspects of resource scarcity must be considered when formulating strategies 
to implement cutback management: 
• People are more willing to make organizational changes if those affected 
have something to gain.  When resources are scarce, organizational change 
will become more difficult since there is little if anything available to 
reward those involved. 
• There are many constraints in public organizations.  Each constraint 
reduces the manager’s options for managing the decline for the good of 
the organization. 
• Organizational decline raises serious morale and job satisfaction problems 
which make it exceedingly difficult to increase productivity and  
• It is less fun to work in an organization plagued with resource scarcity.  
Creativity and innovation inevitably decline (Levine, 1978). 
Under cutback management, the government is faced with the necessity to 
terminate programs, reduce the level of activity in others, and make tradeoffs between 
new demands and old programs rather than, as in the past, simply expand to meet the new 
demand (Cox, 1986). 
Sea Enterprise and cutback management face similar challenges.  Cutback 
management involves making tradeoffs.  Sea Enterprise initiatives are causing leaders to 
make constant tradeoffs between programs, policies, and resources.  Cutback 
management requires changes in behavior and attitude toward doing the same, or more, 
with less.  A culture must be created to understand and believe that cuts will help the 
department as a whole.  Similarly, Sea Enterprise must foster a culture capable of 
identifying savings because of the benefits afforded the enterprise.   
Today the government faces problems similar to those it has faced in the past.  
The concept of cutback management is no different.  The government seeks to operate 
more efficiently, and there are risks, tradeoffs and heartache incurred throughout.  
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Convincing the organization to do more with less is an “intellectual chore” that requires 
persistence, follow-up, and follow-through.   
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter provided background information to lay the foundation for the issues 
raised throughout the remainder of this thesis. With respect to the broad issue of the 
ability of the Department of the Navy to identify and realize savings, it was shown to be a 
highly complex matter.  As the issue was explored it was seen to be a highly interrelated 
mix of managerial issues such as organizational culture, leadership, execution and 
cutback management.  Such a mix requires careful examination in order to resolve the 
relevance and interdependencies among many of the important issues required for deep 
and sustained change; thus creating the transformation necessary to realize savings  
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III. DISCUSSION OF THE SEA ENTERPRISE EFFORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an overview of the Sea Enterprise effort from its inception 
to the present, June 2002 to May 2005.  Further, this chapter provides an extension of the 
foundation provided in Chapter II for analysis of the overall effort provided in Chapter 
IV.  For the reader, this general description of the goals and objectives, structures, 
responsibilities, and processes is necessary to appreciate the range of issues which can 
and do impact the effort as a whole.  The information presented here has been drawn 
from a variety of interviews, from both public and private documents, and testimonies 
provided by top level Department of the Navy leadership. 
 
B. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 
In order to meet the challenges the United States Navy will face throughout the 
twenty-first century and beyond, it is imperative that it transform its force structure, 
processes, and capabilities.  Sea Power 21 has documented and verbalized the efforts of 
senior Navy leadership as to exactly how the Department of the Navy intends to 
transform.  “Sea [Naval] Power 21 prescribes a strategy-to-concepts-to-capabilities 
continuum that will result in greatly enhanced power, protection, and operational 
freedom.  It provides the framework for how we will organize, align, integrate, and 
transform our Navy to meet the challenges that lie ahead” (Clark, 2003). 
The Sea Power 21 vision is based on three fundamental pillars. One, the Navy 
will assure access.  That is, it will assure sea-based access worldwide for military 
operations, diplomatic interaction, and humanitarian relief efforts.  Two, the Navy will 
project power to influence events at sea and ashore both at home and overseas; it projects 
both offensive power and defensive capability.  It defines who we are.  Finally, the DON 
is continually transforming to improve; transforming concepts, organizations, doctrine, 
technology, networks, sensors, platforms, weapon systems, training, education and its 
approach to people.  The ability to transform continuously is at the heart of America’s 
competitive advantage and a foundation of our strength (England, 2002).   
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1. Cost Savings 
Savings efforts, with respect to Sea Enterprise, were first introduced at the Naval 
War College in 2002.  They were presented again in the CNO’s Guidance for 2003.  In 
the section titled “Guidance for Leaders”, the CNO identified three savings goals for 
2003: 
1. Develop equipment and system replacement schedules to achieve 
manpower, operations, and support infrastructure. (N7) 
2. Develop an integrated Navy Resource Planning campaign plan that 
maps legacy infrastructure and retires selected systems to capture 
savings. (N4) 
3. Undertake “skunk works”7 initiatives in each Echelon II command to 
achieve efficiencies via organizational streamlining, technology, 
insertion, and divestment of non-core functions. (All Echelon II) 
(Clark, 2003). 
These savings goals were anticipated to emerge from a Navy-wide effort to align and 
optimize the use of taxpayer dollars.  Through these efforts, additional savings could be 
identified to ultimately harvest efficiencies throughout the organization to reinvest in 
war-fighting capabilities.   
By identifying and eliminating non-core functions that unnecessarily compete for 
resources, it was deemed that the Navy could in turn increase its resources to grow and 
sustain the Navy’s core combat capabilities.  Identification and elimination of non-core 
functions was thought to be possible to achieve in a number of ways.  One, improved 
business practices throughout the department could be implemented to achieve the 
Navy’s combat capabilities in the most economical manner.  Two, these implemented 
business practices could focus on continuous process improvement with metrics for 
measurement and evaluation.  Finally, by dedicating the same level of scrutiny of current 
year fiscal operations as is applied to future-year planning, efficiencies could be realized 
in present years and out years.  Early Sea Enterprise cost savings initiatives were 
intimately tied to the new vision of the Navy, Sea Power 21. 
                                                 
7 “Skunk works” is a reference to Lockheed Martin’s famous Research and Development team.  As 
such, the CNO has sought to develop pilot projects to demonstrate ideas or innovations that can be proven 
then applied.  
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The Sea Enterprise effort supports the three fundamental pillars of the Naval 
Power 21 vision in every aspect.  The Department of the Navy endeavors to become more 
effective and efficient to preserve and realize the vision of Sea Power 21.  As such, Sea 
Enterprise ventures are targeted to help the Navy assure access, enable Naval and Marine 
Corps forces to fight and win, and effectively accelerate the transformation process.  The 
following subsections will identify the different ways it is hoped the Sea Enterprise 
program will help the entire Navy navigate throughout this journey of change. 
 
C. WHAT IS SEA ENTERPRISE? 
Sea Enterprise is an ongoing transformation effort that serves as a vehicle for 
resourcing tomorrow’s fleet.  That is, the Navy seeks to identify improved efficiencies so 
as to generate savings that can be used to help finance Navy transformation.  An essential 
element of the Sea Enterprise effort is the pursuit of new and innovative approaches to 
the “business” of supporting our Naval forces.  According to top level Navy leadership, 
it’s about adopting a business dimension into our Service culture, where effectiveness 
and efficiency are among our primary responsibilities, and cost considerations are key to 
decision making.  Succinctly, it’s not only about getting the job done, but also getting it 
done at the right cost.  That is, it’s about achieving the proper balance between right 
force, right readiness, and right cost (Aviles and Nathman, 2004).  Figure 3.1 below 
articulates this balance graphically. 
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Source: Derived from a PowerPoint brief given to the US Army, 26 February 2005: “Sea     
Enterprise: Right Force, Right Readiness, Right Cost”, delivered by Mr. Mark Honecker (N40) 
 
Figure 3.1 Balancing the Forces of Sea Enterprise 
 
As stated in the CNO’s Guidance for 2003, Sea Enterprise’s goal is to “improve 
organizational alignment, reduce overhead, streamline processes, and reinvest savings to 
recapitalize our Navy and deliver increased combat capability (Clark, 2003).”  Further 
articulated in the CNO’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in 
2004, Sea Enterprise’s key objectives are to: 
• Leverage technology to improve performance and minimize 
manpower costs. 
• Promote competition and reward innovation and efficiency. 
• Challenge institutional encumbrances that impede creativity 
and boldness in innovation. 
• Aggressively divest non-core, under-performing, or 
unnecessary products, services and production capacity. 
• Merge redundant efforts. 
• Minimize acquisition and life-cycle costs. 
• Maximize in-service capital equipment utilization. 
Efficiency      Effectiveness 
Right Force 
Right Readiness Right Costs 
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• Challenge every assumption, cost and requirement.8  
Ultimately, Sea Enterprise is posed as the engagement of the United States Navy 
to do more with less.  Through identifying savings that can be utilized for recapitalization 
of the fleet, in theory, the Navy will be able to realize its vision (Sea Power 21) for the 
twenty-first century.  Is this what was intended for Sea Enterprise?  More specifically, 
what were the intentions and motives of top-level leadership as the Sea Enterprise 
concept was being developed? 
 
1. The “Birth” of Sea Enterprise 
The concept of Sea Enterprise was elucidated by the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Vern Clark.  However, the idea emerged from thoughtful discussions and 
meetings between Admiral Clark and Mr. Gordon England, the Secretary of the Navy.9  
Prior to joining the Administration of George W. Bush, Mr. England served as executive 
vice president of General Dynamics from 1997 to 2001.  During his tenure with General 
Dynamics, Mr. England was successful in reducing operating costs and maximizing 
return on investment (ROI).  He maximized his department’s profit margin by 
streamlining processes and thus increasing overall efficiency.  As such, Mr. England and 
Admiral Clark sought to engage and educate the entire Navy in similar business concepts.   
With concerns similar to those of a corporate America Chief Operating Officer 
(COO), the CNO understood the importance that our leaders have knowledge of sound 
business practices in order to provide the greatest return on the taxpayers’ investment.  
Ultimately, the CNO endeavored to take anticipated savings and reinvest them (plow 
back)10 for recapitalization.  It was thought of as a double-win; (1) the Navy would 
become  more  effective  through investments provided as a result of increased efficiency  
 
                                                 
8 Recorded during the CNO’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), 10 
February, 2004. 
9 As per interview with Mr. Pat Tamburrino (N8B), 25 March 2005. 
10 Plow back is a finance term that refers to retaining assets generated by earnings for continued 
investment in the business; abstracted from Stickney and Weil, 2003. 
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and, (2) the Navy would not be required to ask Congress for more money.  Thus, the 
Navy set out to self-finance its capital improvement.  Hence, Sea Enterprise was born.  
The idea became the process. 
It was next imperative that the CNO create a powerful guiding coalition 
committed to the Sea Enterprise transformation.  He has delivered the Sea Enterprise 
“pitch” in testimonies, the CNO’s annual Guidance, and through the Sea Enterprise 
Board of Directors (SE BOD).  The SE BOD was a group of senior level Navy leadership 
that served as the original guiding coalition to the Sea Enterprise effort.  The SE BOD 
and other entities were held responsible for the development and execution of Sea 
Enterprise initiatives as discussed in the following subsections.   
 
2. Sea Enterprise Board of Directors 
In March 2003, the Navy stood up the Sea Enterprise Board of Directors (SE 
BOD), co-chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) and ASN (RDA 
(Research Development and Acquisition)) and comprised of key elements of the 
headquarters staff, major systems commands, and the Fleet. The Sea Enterprise Board of 
Directors was focused on the execution of existing initiatives programmed in the Navy's 
budget as well as identification of new savings opportunities to generate additional 
resources that could be applied towards recapitalization (England, 2003).  
The senior level management of SE BOD consisted of the CNO’s Staff and more 
specifically, his seven “direct reports.”  The CNO’s “direct reports” consists of the 
Director, Navy Staff (DNS), Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) Manpower and 
Personnel (N1), the Director of Naval Intelligence (N2), the DCNO Plans, Policy, and 
Operations (N3/N5), the DCNO Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4), the DCNO Warfare 
Requirements and Programs (N6/N7), and DCNO of Resources, Requirements, and 
Assessments (N8).  The CNO’s staff and associated SE BOD members are shown 
graphically in Figure 3.2 below; the organizational chart is provided to show the top-level 




Figure 3.2 CNO’s Staff: Senior Level SE BOD Involvement 
 
Initially, the SE BOD consisted of the following representatives: Vice Chief of 
Naval Operations (VCNO) (Co-chair) Admiral Michael Mullen, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy (ASN) (RDA) (Co-chair) the Honorable John Young, Director of Navy Staff 
Vice Admiral (VADM) Patricia Tracey, VADM Gerry Hoewing (N1), VADM Charles 
Moore (N4), VADM John Nathman (N6/N7), VADM Cutler Dawson (N8), VADM 
Walter Massenburg (COMNAVAIR), VADM Phil Balisle (COMNAVSEA), VADM 
Albert Konetzni (Commander, Fleet Forces Command – CFFC), RADM Chris Weaver 
(Commander, Navy Installations Command – CNI).  In total, the primary board consisted 
of eleven people representing a broad spectrum of naval capability. 
The SE BOD met approximately every two weeks. A core of about ten board 
members was an ideal number for discussing innovative approaches to change and 
providing feedback for new processes being implemented within the different commands.  
However, the number of people that attended the meetings began to increase.  As the 
number of attendees increased (from ten to thirty on some occasions), the productivity of 
the meetings decreased.   
Senior Level SE 
BOD Involvement 
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Although the SE BOD represented a valiant initial effort to create a guiding 
coalition; there were some adjustments that required mending.  One of SE BOD’s most 
prominent initiatives implemented was Target Setting.     
 
a. Target Setting 
In 2003, ADM Michael Mullen, then Vice Chief of Naval Operations and 
Mr. John Young, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RDA) authored a memorandum titled 
“POM 06 Target Setting”.  The memorandum delineated a minimum 5% reduction in the 
cost of doing business, consistent with the CNO’s Guidance for 2004.  This 5% reduction 
became known as the “target.”   
The 5% target was a department-wide “bogey,” as some Commanders 
were clearly in the position to save more than 5% and some had already conducted 
several cost reduction efforts.  For example, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 
(BUMED) was able to identify an approximate $11 million target (out of $146 million 
appropriated) or 7.5% savings in FY 2006 dollars (Mullen and Young, 2003).  According 
to the memorandum, the target approach “enable[d] development of an effective strategy 
to deal with the realities of external pressures in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 
and Execution System (PPBES) process, properly price the full range of our efforts and, 
most importantly, provide a means for supporting critical Future Readiness and 
transformation initiatives in POM06 (Mullen and Young, 2003).”   
The Target Setting approach no longer employed a “wedge” cut 
methodology.  Rather, this approach consisted of two major focus shifts.  First, 
Commanders were afforded full latitude in determining the method(s) by which to 
achieve cost reduction targets.  “Critical to this latitude is the ability to present a credible 
process by which the cost reductions can be achieved and be able to articulate the cost 
reductions in terms of specific budget accounts (Mullen and Young, 2003).”  Secondly, 
the focus was on maintaining output, but accomplishing it at reduced cost.  This shift was 
expected to drive Commanders to both an examination of low value added efforts for 
elimination as well as driving down the expense side of their businesses (Mullen and 
Young, 2003). 
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Target Setting focused on accounts on the Operations side of the 
Department.  As such, the accounts were associated with fleet and shore readiness, 
training, personnel, and support (including life cycle support of platforms and systems).  
The vast majority of savings in this part of the budget were expected to come from 
improvements in productivity and business efficiencies such as substituting technology 
for labor, overhead reduction, consolidation of like efforts, elimination of excesses, etc 
(Mullen and Young, 2003).  Although targets were issued to Echelon II Commanders, all 
levels of the organization were expected to collaborate on achievement of savings.   
Business “rules”, under which the Target process was governed during 
POM 06, were provided.  The overarching objectives of the Target process were: 
• Create a culture that fosters a continuous review of program 
and process costs.  
• Allow Commanders full latitude to assign cost reduction 
targets to the sectors of their business they feel most 
appropriate in response to Department Fiscal Guidance. 
• Return funds to the Department of the Navy that can be 
reinvested in the CNO’s Transformational Agenda (including 
modernization and recapitalization programs). 
• Return funds to the Department of the Navy that can be used to 
satisfy externally imposed “end game” requirements vice 
requiring a large set of program offsets. 
• Return funds to the Department of the Navy to support 
initiatives that relate to proper pricing of major programs. 
• Create an investment tool to support start-up of new initiatives 
that show significant Return on Investment projections (Mullen 
and Young, 2003). 
The “rules” specified above are more closely related to goals or initiatives.  
A rule includes the “what” and the “how.”  A “goal” can be defined as the “state of 
affairs that a plan is intended to achieve, and that (when achieved) terminates behavior 
intended to achieve it.” Therefore, a goal is definite and behavior is not sustained.  A 
“rule” however, can be defined as “a principle or condition that customarily governs 
behavior.”  That is, a “rule” defines “what” one will do and “how” one will behave 
unconditionally,  and  until otherwise directed.  In the Target Setting “rules” above, there  
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is some indication of the “what”, but they neither define the “how”, nor model sustained 
behavior, and thus cannot be considered rules.  This is an important distinction to make 
between rules and goals.11  
Accounting principles associated with the Target process were a major 
concern and critical aspect of the effort.  The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(Resources, Requirements, and Assessments) (N8) was charged with putting in place the 
processes, practices and tools that would allow for robust and accurate accounting of all 
cost reduction targets and associated initiatives.  It was further mandated that targets 
could not simply be “cost avoidance.” Rather, the intended focus was on improving 
productivity by first defining the “right” level of output and then driving efficiencies 
throughout the Department’s organizations to achieve that level of output at the lowest 
possible cost. 
The resource sponsors played a major role in the effort.  Resource 
sponsors were mandated to support Echelon II Commanders and aid them in creating 
innovative ways to generate financial savings (Mullen and Young, 2003).  However, 
resource sponsors and Echelon II commands were not to reprioritize or apply savings.  
Rather, this was deemed a collective leadership function of the SE BOD with final 
approval resting at the CNO and Staff N8/SECNAV level.  This methodology was a 
significant change from past practices where internal program generated savings would 
first be resolved and reapplied by the resource sponsors.  Savings generated were to be 
allocated based on CNO prioritized needs and potential return to the enterprise.  Savings 
were not recognized and allocated until specific initiatives were identified and 
documented, the associated savings were validated, and the savings were “tagged” to a 
discrete budget line item or program element which contained the funds no longer 
required. 
Although some of these processes put in place might appear to be useful to 
identify and realize savings, the Target Setting process was not as effective as top level 
leadership had hoped it would be.  That is, to many, the process was seen as nothing other 
than another budget drill.  The 3-star BOD’s mandate was to champion the vision and 
                                                 
11 Rules and goals as defined in this excerpt were abstracted from http://www.google.com; “define: 
rule” and “define: goal” for rules and goals respectively. 
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imperatives (i.e., change culture, processes and structure, and harvest savings) (Moore, 
2003).  Was a culture with the ability and willingness to save created?  According to top 
level Navy officials, such a culture was considered, but not realized in the effort to 
initiate the identification and realization of savings.  
 
3. Corporate Business Council (CBC) 
On 22 October 2004, and in accordance with the “Promulgation of the Corporate 
Business Council (CBC) Charter for Sea Enterprise Governance,” the SE BOD was 
dissolved and the CBC was established (Nathman and Aviles, 2004).  CBC is established 
to facilitate business transformation and to foster a culture of productivity and continuous 
improvement.  The purpose of the DON CBC is to provide corporate leadership and 
governance over enterprise business process improvement efforts.  The CBC meets at 
least every two weeks to consider enterprise-wide cross functional initiatives; track 
progress/assess results of CBC proposed initiatives; review Sea Enterprise execution 
status; and address significant Sea Enterprise issues.  It is a forum empowered to act to 
further Sea Enterprise objectives (Nathman and Aviles, 2004).  The duties and 
responsibilities of CBC are as follows: 
• Foster Sea Enterprise goals through routine engagement with Echelon II 
commands to foster a culture of productivity and continuous improvement. 
• Develop, articulate, advocate and ensure the execution of high potential, 
cross-functional enterprise initiatives.  Assign champions as necessary to 
implement initiatives. 
• Ensure savings are harvested and returned to the corporation for 
reallocation against other Navy priorities.  Redistribution of harvest 
savings is not under the purview of the CBC. 
• Track and integrate Echelon II business initiatives. 
• Manage across functional and organizational seams to ensure 
opportunities for enhanced performance and organizational efficiencies 
are not lost in the “white space.” 
• Sponsor investments in cross-enterprise efficiency initiatives. 
• Facilitate barrier removal and organizational impediments to change. 
• Address policy changes necessitated by the transformation effort. 
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• Ensure Sea Enterprise and CNO Echelon II Review lessons-learned are 
leveraged across the enterprise, where appropriate. 
• Provide progress reports to VCNO/Under Secretary of the Navy 
(UNSECNAV) on a quarterly basis.  
• Ensure senior leadership awareness of significant issues impacting the 
efficient and effective delivery of products and services to the warfighter. 
• Leverage the 3-star BOD when needed to remove barriers; and support 
transformational, enterprise level, business process initiatives (Nathman 
and Aviles, 2004). 
The CBC is accountable to the VCNO and the UNSECNAV.  The Deputy Chief 
of Naval Operations (Fleet Readiness and Logistics) (N4) is the CBC sponsor, and serves 
as the interface to the 3-star Board of Directors relative to CBC matters.   
The CBC is co-chaired by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet 
Readiness and Logistics) (N4B) and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(Requirement, Resources, and Assessments) (N8B).  Other members are selected by the 
Commanders of each domain (i.e., Type Commander) to be their representative on the 
council.  CBC principal membership is represented by the following commands and/or 
billets: DCNO (N1B); DCNO (N6/7B); Deputy Director, Navy Staff (DDNS); CFFC 
designated senior leader; Aviation, Surface and Submarine Domain senior leaders; 
Commander, Navy Installations (CNI); Navy Chief Information Officer; SYSCOM 
senior leader (Senior SYSCOM rep); UNSECNAV designated senior leader; FMB 
designated senior leader; and Headquarters Marine Corps designated senior leader.   
OPNAV N40 plays a major role in the CBC.  N40 serves as the Executive 
Secretary, and is responsible for all administrative support of CBC.  Such administrative 
responsibilities include publishing the meeting agendas and procedures, disseminating 
schedule information and maintaining and publishing records of meetings.  Issues and 
agenda topics of interest of the co-chairs and principal board members are submitted to 
N40 for consideration.  Additionally, N40 keeps the CBC informed of the status of CNO 
Echelon II Execution Review12 (schedule and outcomes) (Nathman and Aviles, 2004).  
Action items are then passed to the appropriate DON organizations for coordination and 
response.   
                                                 
12 CNO Echelon II Execution Reviews are discussed later in this chapter. 
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As the CNO’s financial officer, OPNAV N8 has been charged with executing the 
fiduciary responsibilities associated with CBC operations.  As such, N8 responsibilities 
are to review CBC initiatives, and advise co-chairs of their compatibility with all DOD 
and DON financial management policies; provide business case analysis validation for 
the CBC; document the details of savings initiatives in the context of the PPBES process; 
track initiative execution through the Future Year’s Defense Plan (FYDP) and ensure the 
savings entries are posted to the Program Budget Information System (PBIS) database, 
where appropriate (Nathman and Aviles, 2004).    
The discussion of the different players involved with the Sea Enterprise effort 
gives rise to the formation of a strategic framework. This framework combines enterprise 




























Source: Derived from a PowerPoint brief given to the US Army, 26 February 2005: “Sea Enterprise: Right 
Force, Right Readiness, Right Cost”, delivered by Mr. Mark Honecker (N40)13. 
 
Figure 3.3 Sea Enterprise Framework 
 
4. Echelon II Commanders 
Echelon II Commanders have been charged to return funds (savings) to the 
Department of the Navy to be reinvested in the CNO’s transformational agenda.  In the 
initial outset of Sea Enterprise savings initiatives, to reflect the savings in the Navy 
budget and/or program, spending levels of individual budget line items were reduced 
accordingly.  Therefore, the money was taken away, as if it had been saved. 
Savings are initiated by Echelon II Commanders.  Savings are identified in 
several ways; the following are provided to name a few.  One, savings can be identified 
within a program where innovation of the workforce results in efficiencies to meet 
mission requirements at a lesser cost.  Two, savings can be identified in legacy systems, 
programs,  and  activities  to  accelerate  transformational  programs.   An  example  of  a  
                                                 
13 In Figure 4, TPO is an acronym for Transformation Program Office.  A TPO brokers ideas fostered 







































transformational program is SC-21 Total Engineering which is a Program Element that 
provides funds for the development of the DD(X).  Also, savings can be identified by 
simply making a cut to a program.   
The CNO has dedicated time to conduct formal visits to Echelon II Commanders 
called CNO Execution Reviews.  The visits provide the CNO the opportunity to engage 
with top level leadership.  Overall, the visits focus on effectiveness and efficiency and are 
conversational in nature.  The CNO considers this top level communication an essential 
step to achieving Sea Enterprise objectives (Honecker, 2004).  Specifically, the CNO 
discusses that Sea Enterprise is essential to Sea Power 21 and a leader’s job is to 
accomplish mission and control costs.  A critical topic of discussion is the CNO’s interest 
in enhancing productivity.  Productivity, as the CNO defines it, equals output divided by 
cost (Honecker, 2004).  Further, enhancing productivity involves understanding and 
controlling costs and defining and measuring output.  Understanding risks and balancing 
priorities, and maximizing ROI are also discussed.  Finally, the CNO stresses that the 
Navy can no longer afford costs growing at the rate of inflation and readiness at any cost.   
The CNO Execution Reviews include two rounds of review.  The first round 
consists of fourteen areas with information covering the following topics: 
1. Core missions and functions. 
2. Key activities and services. 
3. Key constraints. 
4. Internal/subordinate organizational command layers. 
5. Define internal/external associated billet base (active, reserve, civilian, and 
contractor). 
6. Budget trend: 5-year history and distribution (by account – current year 
dollars). 
7. ROI trend: 5-year history of associated output metric (by account – current year 
dollars). 
8. Current year budget plan and execution rate. 
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9. Current year ROI by associated output metric. 
10. Budget: FYDP forecast and apportion plan. 
11. Manning: 5-year history and distribution. 
12. Manning: FYDP forecast and apportion plan. 
13. Future “Mission Plan” and associated risks. 
14. Recommended skunk works Proposals. 
The first round visit establishes a baseline for each command.  Consequently, 
upon completion of the visit, an action item list is generated and tracked by the Echelon 
II Commander.  An important point to note is that each Echelon II Commander tracks, 
manages, and reports his/her own action item list, without the scrutiny of an independent 
audit. 
The purpose of the second round visits is to evaluate the progress the command is 
making on first round action items.  Additionally, round two consists of an analysis of the 
progression of the command in creating the environment and/or incorporating processes 
that encourage innovation.  More pointed questions are, (1) what is the process and/or 
structure that has been created and (2) what are the results?   
The status of developing a Human Resources Strategy for the future is also 
evaluated.  Specifically, the command reports its understanding of the current status of 
Human Resources, determining the right mix of people (among military, civilian, and 
contractor), what is being accomplished to shape the workforce for the future, how the 
new tools are being leveraged, and what additional tools are required.    
In the CNO’s Guidance for 2004, Admiral Clark states “[w]e will seek innovative 
means to improve productivity.”  As such, the understanding of productivity is of great 
importance to the CNO and is also evaluated during round two reviews.  Furthermore, a 
thorough understanding of output and costs fosters a greater understanding of 
productivity.  Specifically, productivity = output/cost.   Specific questions asked 
regarding productivity include, how do you know the right level of output is being 
provided?; what output trade-offs are considered?; what are the risks?; are all costs being 
captured?; what is driving costs?; and what is being done to reduce costs?  
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Ideally, the initiatives pursued by Echelon II Commanders lead to identified 
savings.  Once the savings are identified by Echelon II Commanders, the resource 
sponsors review the savings initiatives.  The resource sponsors for each community are 























CODE RESOURCE SPONSOR 
N09B Director, Navy Staff 
N1 Director, Manpower and Personnel 
N2 Director, Naval Intelligence 
N4 Director, Fleet Readiness and Logistics 
N6 Director, Space, Information Warfare, Command 
and Control 
N7 Programs 
N00N Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
N091 Director, Navy T&E and Technology Requirements 
N093 Surgeon General of the Navy 
N095 Director, Naval Reserve 
N096 Oceanographer of the Navy 
N097 Director of Religious Ministries/Chief of Chaplains 
of the Navy 
N83 Director, CINC Liaison 
N71 Director, Naval Missile Defense 
N74 Director, Naval Anti-Submarine Warfare 
N75 Director, Naval Expeditionary Warfare 
N76 Director, Surface Warfare 
 N77 Director, Submarine Warfare 
N78 Director, Air Warfare 
N79 Director, Training 
N89 Director, Special Programs 
HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps 
Source: CDR Phil Candreva (Graduate School of Business & Public Policy); Practical Financial Management: A 
Handbook of Practical Financial Management Topics for the DOD Financial Manager, Version 5, Revision 2. 
 
Table 3.1 Resource Sponsors of the United Stated Navy 
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Resource sponsors defend and act on the best interests of the community they 
support.  That is, resource sponsors have uses for the money they save and obligate and 
spend that money internally.  As explained earlier (see pg 51), this concept conflicts with 
their mandate to return savings to the CBC with final application approval resting at the 
CNO and Staff N8/CBC level.  Appropriate questions to ask in this case are: does this 
conflict of interest result in lost savings or savings reapplied at the wrong level?; has a 
culture been created enterprise-wide that is incentivized and capable of identifying and 
realizing savings?; and where are the data to support either argument? 
 
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a brief overview of the Sea Enterprise effort from its 
inception to the present.  The Sea Enterprise effort endeavors to foster innovation at the 
lowest level, increase productivity (that is, properly assign costs and measure output), 
maximize efficiency while maintaining effectiveness, and thus identify and realize 
savings in support of Sea Power 21.  A unique and dynamic set of goals and objectives, 
structures, responsibilities, and processes present a range of issues that can and do impact 
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IV. SEA ENTERPRISE: ANALYSIS OF EFFORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes data from various sources to determine if savings were 
actually realized with the Sea Enterprise Program.  Where forecasted savings were not 
realized, some identifiable problems and issues are provided for consideration.  Overall, 
this chapter will answer the primary and secondary research questions specified in 
Chapter I of this thesis. 
Information was collected from a variety of sources to capture savings data for 
analysis.  Interviews were conducted with personnel from a variety of commands with 
intimate ties to the Sea Enterprise effort.  The interviews sought information about 
processes, initiatives, tracking methods, organizational culture, leadership, barriers to 
efficiency, and most importantly, verified savings.  Most of the interviews conducted 
were informal, discussing areas familiar to the interviewee.  Respondents consisted of 
current civilian Senior Executive Service (SES) members of the Corporate Business 
Council and from OPNAV, a former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial 
Management and Comptroller), current SYSCOM (Echelon II) Sea Enterprise agents, 
current staff members to the CBC Executive Secretary (N40), and other personnel 
supporting Sea Enterprise in various capacities. 
 
B. THE “PROCESS” OF HARVESTING SAVINGS 
As stated previously in this thesis, perhaps the single most telling measure of 
success of Sea Enterprise is harvested savings.  For purposes of this thesis, savings are 
considered harvested savings when (and only when) unexecuted funds are returned to the 
CBC/N8 for recapitalization (with final discretion of the CNO), as it was intended when 
Sea Enterprise was initiated.  However, many steps must be taken prior to realizing 
harvested savings.  They are: the determination of initiatives to be pursued, 
implementation of initiatives, identification of possible savings due to efficiencies (and 
other reasons), tracking savings, and finally harvesting savings.  This course of action 
requires communication, clarity of purpose, and consensus; and perhaps most 
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importantly, accountability and execution.  It also requires persistence and continuity; 
any hindrance to this process may jeopardize the ultimate harvest.  This section will 
reveal some fundamental issues identified with this process.   
 
1. Savings Initiatives 
First, numerous savings initiatives were identified by Echelon II Commanders to 





















PB03-PB05 Major Initiatives POM06 Major Initiatives 
Divestitures/Retirements 
• Inactive Inventory Recovery 
• Land Sales Revenue 
• Ship/Aircraft Retirements 
•  Weapon System Retirements 
Improved Acquisition 
• Acquisition Re-phase 
• LPD/DDG Workload Swap 
• Multi-year Procurements 
• T-5 Tanker (Ship) Lease Buyout 
Improved Infrastructure 
• Base Management Regionalization 
• Headquarters Activities Reductions 
Improved Operations 
• Mission Fund Shipyards 
• Revolution in Training 
• Workload Validation 
Improved Processes 
• Acquisition Organization Efficiencies 
• ERP 
• IT Legacy Applications Reduction 
Demand Changes 
• Product – force structure, inventory 
• Activity/Service Level 
Divestitures/Retirements 
• Inactive Inventory Recovery 
• Land Sales Revenue 
• Ship/Aircraft Retirements 
• Weapon System Retirements 
Efficiencies 
• Organizational 
• Active Military Personnel 
• Civilian Substitution 
• SELRES 
• Civilian Personnel/All Other      
            Costs 
• Operational/Process 
• Application of IT products  
            and services 





Source:  PowerPoint Brief to Sea Enterprise Board of Directors; delivered by Mr. Pat Tamburrino (N8B).  
State of Sea Enterprise Savings Harvest: PB 03, PB 04, and PB 05 Initiatives, 9 July 2004. 
 
Table 4.1 PB03-PB05 and POM06 Savings Initiatives 
 
To evaluate initiatives and track progress, it is critical that all constituents monitor 
and track the same initiatives and utilize the same definitions of concepts expressing the 
themes with the overall Sea Enterprise effort; namely, savings harvested, programs, 
projects, accountability measures, and performance metrics, among others.  With respect 
to Sea Enterprise, this requirement has not been realized.  Numerous initiatives have been 
created and implemented, but not all have been tied to Sea Enterprise.  According to SE 
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BOD/CBC, Echelon II Commanders, and others directly tied to Sea Enterprise; the 
initiatives specified in Table 4.1 were considered “Sea Enterprise” initiatives.  However, 
it appears that the Office of Budget (FMB) office records differ.  For example, in FMB’s 
Program Budget Information System (PBIS) database, they recognize only five 
improvement processes (initiatives) from Sea Enterprise, while other official entities 
within the DON recognize many more.  For instance, see Table 4.1.  Figure 4.1 depicts 
the disparity between initiatives tracked under the umbrella of Sea Enterprise and “Other 
Initiatives.” 
  
Source: Excel Spreadsheet: “Master Savings as of 05 PB”, FMB. 
 
Figure 4.1 Sea Enterprise Initiatives and “Other Initiatives” tracked by FMB 
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According to FMB, Sea Enterprise initiatives include Level of Effort14 (LOE) I, 
LOE II, Correct LOE Adjustment, LOE Technical Correction, and NAVSUP 
Transformation.  In this case, it is not as important to know what the initiatives entail, as 
it is critical to realize that clarity, communication, and consensus have not been achieved 
regarding what Sea Enterprise initiatives are.  If constituents are not tracking the same 
initiatives, how can success of the effort be fairly and accurately measured? 
 
2. “Accounting” for Savings 
In May 2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) made the following 
report: 
As we have reported for years, DOD does not have the ability to produce 
accurate, reliable, and timely information to make sound decisions and to 
accurately report on its billions of dollars of inventory and other assets. In 
addition, the department’s stove-piped, duplicative systems contribute to 
its vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse.  
(GAO, 2004)   
Within the DON, the same financial system difficulties persist.  In FY2004, DOD 
reported it had 2,274 business systems15 for which the DON requested $3.8 billion 
(20.2% of DOD’s request) for maintenance of and investment in such systems in FY04.  
Even with implementation of a new budget database, the Program Budget Information 
System (PBIS), the DON continues to confront pervasive financial and business 
management problems related to its systems, processes (including internal controls), and 
people (human capital) (GAO, 2004). 
Prior to FY03, the Navy Headquarters Budget System (NHBS) served as the host 
system for the Navy’s actual budget tracking system, the Navy Budget Tracking System 
(NBTS).  NBTS was an issue-based database which stored all adjustments to the budget 
down to the detail level.  The ability to track such adjustments or changes allowed for the 
ability to monitor decreases to programs and thus savings.  In 2003, the Program 
Objectives Memorandum database, WINPAT (Windows Program Analysts Toolkit),                                                  
14 LOE programs are those that are not driven by specific force structure or readiness decisions, those 
that cannot be optimized by cost benefit analysis, and are often based primarily on historical execution 
levels.  LOE programs comprise about 10% of DON TOA. 
15 Business systems referred to here include those that are used to support finance only. 
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merged with NBTS into the new budget database, PBIS, to consolidate programming and 
budgeting into a single database. 
Although the PBIS database has provided the DON greater visibility of program 
elements (PE) and budget activities (BA) and adjustments to such activities, the database 
still falls short of “accounting” for savings. This is true for three reasons: (1) PBIS lacks 
the capability to transition accounts smoothly from one budget cycle to the next; which 
leads to (2) human error; and finally (3) in the end game,16 adjustments are made to 
accounts for numerous reasons that have previously been flagged as savings.   
Issues and titles associated with particular budget activities change each budget 
cycle (Tompa, 2005).  PBIS does not readily account for these changes.  Issues and titles 
must be entered manually during each budget cycle.  In some cases, analysts may not 
code or enter the data correctly into PBIS; and in other cases when issues and titles 
change, analysts may not update the database to account for the change.  Therefore, an 
element of human error exists.  If savings are identified in a particular activity and its 
associated issue and title are entered incorrectly into PBIS, savings that had been 
previously identified are lost.17   
Adjustments are made to accounts in the end game for numerous reasons.  It is 
important to understand that PBIS allows for easy “tracking” (not accountability) and 
reapplication of money.  Typically, certain dollar amounts within particular accounts are 
earmarked as savings until the end game.  As such, those with the proper authority (i.e., 
Echelon II Commanders, N82/FMB) can ‘sweep up’ and reapply identified savings to 
“higher priority” accounts.  Therefore, identified savings can be lost to the Sea Enterprise 
effort. 
 
3. Reported Savings: Fiscal Year 2003-2009   
It seems logical that reported savings would be a telling measure of the success 
(or failure) of the Sea Enterprise effort thus far.  However, this measure proves valid only 
                                                 
16 The end game refers to the third stage of the PPBE cycle (the budget phase) in which adjustments 
are made to programs and accounts to provide the right “balance.”  The right “balance” is defined and 
communicated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  
17 Issue and title input provided by Ms. Mary K. Tompa, FMB. 
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if the savings are real, measurable, and verified.  As a result of this research, three 
different sets of savings figures were discovered, which cannot be reconciled.  The 
following paragraphs outline the three sets of savings tracked by different agents within 
the DON and the confusion that lingers therein. 
 
a. SE BOD Estimated Savings (July 2004) 
As discussed in Chapter III, the Navy stood up the Sea Enterprise Board of 
Directors (SE BOD) in 2003.  The SE BOD was focused on execution of existing 
initiatives programmed in the Navy’s budget as well as identification of new savings 
opportunities to generate additional resources towards recapitalization.  As such, the 
DON sought to eliminate non-core functions that unnecessarily compete for resources.  
Cost savings initiatives were developed to help find savings throughout the DON.  A 
summary of Sea Enterprise initiatives and resultant savings from President’s Budget (PB) 
03, PB04, and PB05 were collected by and presented to the Sea Enterprise Board of 
Directors on 9 July 2004.  Figure 4.2 below summarizes the harvest. 
 
Source:  PowerPoint Brief to Sea Enterprise Board of Directors.  State of Sea Enterprise Savings Harvest: 
PB 03, PB 04, and PB 05 Initiatives, 9 July 2004. 
 































Figures above reflected in billions ($) 
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Sea Enterprise initiatives were expected to produce $46.2 billion ($44.4B 
Navy and $1.8B Marine Corps) of net savings to the Department over the FY03-09 
period.  To reflect the savings in the Navy budget and/or programs, spending levels of 
individual budget line items were reduced accordingly.  The money was taken away, as if 
it had been saved.   
As of the summer FY04, 33% ($14.8B) of the savings were lost.18  
Further, 4% ($1.9B) was not auditable, and therefore could not be considered savings.  
84% ($23.4B) of the remaining $27.7 billion that could still be saved had, in fact, already 
been “saved.”  That is, based on the initial figures, it was reported that $23.4 billion had 
been harvested.  Plus, an additional $4.3 billion are expected to be harvested for a total of 
$27.7 billion of savings through FY09.  Overall, according to these figures, Sea 
Enterprise initiatives will realize 60% of forecasted savings of $46.2 billion.  
 
b. Savings Identified in Congressional Backup to PB06 Budget 
Request  
An updated set of savings estimates was used for Congressional back-up 
to support the PB06 budget request on Capitol Hill.  Although not confirmed, the author 
is reasonably assured that the following savings estimates were derived from the PBIS 
database for the Corporate Business Council (CBC).  The report stated that Sea 
Enterprise had identified $44.9 billion across the FYDP in cost avoidance19 through 
efficiencies (Final Business Transformation Input, 2005).  Further, it was determined that 
the FY05 budget alone reflects approximately $5.4 billion in avoided costs.  These 
savings were recorded as a result of a series of initiatives started in FY01-03 by the SE 
BOD.  In addition to the FY05 benefits, the FY01-03 initiatives resulted in approximately 
$3.7 billion of avoided costs over FY02-04 and an estimate of approximately $14.7 
billion in cost avoidance over FY06-09.  As such, for the entire FY02-09 period, total 
avoided costs are estimated to be $23.8 billion.  Navy leadership, to include the 3-star 
BOD, validated and ensured that execution of these initiatives and associated savings 
remain on track.   
                                                 
18 Various reasons for lost savings will be explained in follow-on sections. 
19 In essence, cost avoidance is not considered savings; efficiencies are not identified and the costs 
will continue to be “real” in the out-years.  
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c. Sea Enterprise Savings Tracked by FMB 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, FMB recognizes Sea Enterprise 
initiatives to include LOE I, LOE II, Correct LOE Adjustment, LOE Technical 
Correction, and NAVSUP Transformation.  Not surprisingly, there is a significant 
disparity between FMB’s savings estimates (as depicted in Figure 4.1) and those of the 
Echelon II Commanders/Resource Sponsors (as depicted in Table 4.1).  Specifically, 
FMB recognizes $898 million (see Figure 4.1) in “identified” savings across the FYDP, 
while the SE BOD estimates $27.7 billion.  Additionally, Echelon II Commanders, 
Resource Sponsors, and FMB reapply and shift money within accounts to fund other high 
priority requirements.     
FMB moves to “balance” budget accounts in the budgeting phase.  
Balancing is required to match the PBIS database to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense Comptroller Information System (OSD CIS)20 database at each submission of 
budgetary data.  That is, there is a prioritized list of items to be funded so, if and when 
funds are available (i.e., identified savings), the list is addressed in order of precedence, 
as indicated by Navy leadership.21  Savings may be applied to programs to achieve the 
OSD “balance” where that action is based on knowledge that the program was short of 
funding prior to the review, the CNO (or other top level officials) had expressed concerns 
with the program, or simply an account is needed to place some funding to achieve a 
certain appropriation/budget activity mix of funding as specified by OSD.  In the latter 
case, FMB attempts to augment programs that may need funding in the future, or have an 
unusual profile that will be hard to justify.   
Overall, numerous considerations in the end game may defeat savings 
efforts that are loosely worked toward.  In some cases, Navy leadership directs FMB to 
“buy back” some portion or all of a reduction that was identified at the beginning of the 
PPBE cycle.  It is also important to recognize that savings targets and initiatives are 
                                                 
20 The Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller Information System (OSD CIS) is used by OSD 
to convey budgetary adjustments to each Service’s and Component’s funding controls.  It also provides a 
family of supporting reports that highlight these CIS changes by certain categories (Program Budget 
Decisions (PBDs), for example).  
21 In this case, leadership is referred to as any one of the following: the Secretary of the Navy, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller), the Chief of Naval Operations, 
or the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. 
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typically driven by OPNAV while the rest of the budget cycle is run by the Secretariat.  
Since Sea Enterprise is perceived as mainly an OPNAV effort (not an enterprise-wide 
effort), if objectives and targets are not clearly communicated through the FMB analysts 
and subsequently through the OSD analysts, then all efforts to harvest savings may be 
defeated or significantly jeopardized.   
As stated above, harvested savings can be less than forecasted due to 
adjustments made throughout the “process” and in the end game.  For example, in 2003, a 
"Level of Effort" program was initiated by N8B.  Specifically, a 10% reduction was 
directed to selected programs.  Approximately $300 million was taken from OMN 
(Operations and Maintenance) support programs (in general).  After taking into 
consideration inflation and other end game adjustments, the targeted programs had a net 
decrease of only $90 million.  The effort was genuine, but once OSD issued final 
controls, the aforementioned programs were adversely affected.22   Hence, even when 
there is effort given to identifying and realizing savings, harvested savings can be less 
than forecasted due to adjustments made throughout the “process” and in the end game. 
 
4. A Unifying Definition of Realized “Savings” 
“Savings” are being tracked and reported by several different entities throughout 
the DON.  However, as stated above, there is a lack of transparency and accountability in 
the Navy’s systems.  Further, and arguably more importantly with respect to harvested 
savings, a standard definition for what constitutes “savings” (with respect to Sea 
Enterprise) does not exist. 
Within the DON, there must be consensus and understanding as to when savings 
are, in fact, “savings.”  This need is especially pressing for Sea Enterprise.  The term 
“savings” is used throughout the DON and conjures a variety of meanings.  For example, 
the term “savings” is used when efficiencies are identified within a particular program or 
account prior to execution.  There are many “fact of life” adjustments that can hinder the 
realization of savings at this stage.  The term “savings” is used when funds are “left over” 
or unexecuted in an execution year within specific Echelon II Command accounts.  At 
                                                 
22 Example per FMB staff. 
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this stage, and as previously mentioned, money can be reapplied by the commands to 
meet other high priority needs.  The term is used when Echelon II commands enter 
unexecuted savings data in PBIS and forward them to the cognizant Resource Sponsor.  
At this stage, the Resource Sponsors, who typically act in the best interest of their 
communities (not necessarily the enterprise), may reapply money for “must pay” bills.23  
Therefore, as stated earlier in this chapter and for purposes of this thesis, savings should 
be recognized as harvested or realized “savings” when (and only when) unexecuted funds 
are returned to the CBC/N8 for recapitalization (with final discretion of the CNO), as it 
was intended when Sea Enterprise was initiated.      
Ensure savings are harvested and returned to the corporation for 
reallocation against other Navy priorities.   
ADM John B. Nathman, VCNO and Mr. Dionel M. Aviles (USN)24 
 
5. Actual Realized “Savings” Per Unifying Definition 
Despite reported savings by different agencies throughout the DON, actual 
realized “savings” (those savings returned to the CBC/N8 for recapitalization) appear to 
be a lot more modest than the tens of billions of dollars reported as identified and 
harvested.  In summary, the savings figures reported by the SE BOD show that $46.2 
billion in savings have been identified across the FYDP and $23.4 billion have been 
harvested (with an additional $4.3 billion pending across the FYDP); the CBC reports 
that $44.9 billion in savings have been identified across the FYDP, the FY05 budget 
alone reflects $5.4 billion in avoided costs, and that the expected harvest is $23.8 billion 
across the FYDP, and finally; FMB recognizes $898 million across the FYDP in 
identified savings as a result of Sea Enterprise initiatives they track.  
Using a more restrictive definition of harvested or realized “savings” as when 
(and only when) money has been returned to the enterprise (CBC/N8) for recapitalization 
and/or modernization.  This analysis has determined that harvested savings more closely 
                                                 
23 It is important to understand that “savings” are, in fact, realized at the Echelon II and Resource 
Sponsor commands.  Savings referred to here are strictly Sea Enterprise “savings.”  If “savings” are the 
single most telling measure of success, then a standard definition of Sea Enterprise “savings” must exist.     
24 Abstracted from: Promulgation of the CBC Charter for Sea Enterprise Governance (22 OCT 2004).  
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approximates a much smaller total $40 million.25  For comparison, actual savings is just 
.08% ($40M/$46.2B) of what the SE BOD estimated across the FYDP and .17% 
($40M/$23.5B) of what was reported as harvested.  Also, actual savings is .09% 
($40M/$44.9B) of what the CBC estimated and .17% ($40M/$23.8M) of the expected 
harvest across the FYDP.  Additionally, $40M of actual savings is just 4.45% of what 
FMB recognizes as identified savings.  However, as indicated earlier, FMB does not 
recognize the same Sea Enterprise initiatives as the CBC and previously, the SE BOD.   
The percentages indicated above do not alone serve as an accurate or appropriate 
measure of the success (or failure) of the Sea Enterprise effort.  Rather, the percentages 
create a more realistic framework for reference.  By establishing consensus as to what 
truly constitutes savings and identifying the many obstacles to achieving them, the 
enterprise can start communicating in “real” terms and establish equal footing.  
 
C. CULTURE 
As stated in Chapter II, the culture of an organization speaks of the values, 
beliefs, and behaviors that are shared by the members of the organization.  It is first 
essential to note that the values, beliefs, and behaviors must be shared.  That is, a change 
in culture occurs throughout an organization, and not just with a few individuals.  
Changing a culture, altering behaviors and attitudes, does not necessarily result in 
changing everything an organization does, but rather changes the way an organization 
thinks about what it does and how it does it.  Consider the following example: it is easier 
and more effective to act one’s way into right thinking than to think one’s way into right 
acting. 
It is critical to understand that in the Department of Defense there is resistance to 
change which is part of the reason efficiencies are difficult to achieve.  The Chief of 
Naval Operations wrote in his guidance for 2005, “Bringing the fight to our enemies is 
our mission.  Transforming ourselves and our great institution for the dangerous decades 
ahead is our imperative (Clark, 2005).”  The primary and overriding mission of the Navy 
is to fight and win wars.  Although “transforming” is mentioned in the CNO’s mission 
statement, there is no mention of efficiencies (i.e., transforming efficiently, winning 
                                                 
25 As reported by co-chair of the CBC. 
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efficiently, etc).  Without specific mention of “efficiency” in the mission statement, or 
changing the culture to expect efficiency in all aspects of personal and organizational 
behavior, the Navy should not expect efficiency to become a top priority.  That is not to 
say efficiency should come at the expense of losing a war, but rather efficiency could 
help the Navy win wars at lesser cost and help maximize resources; as the Sea Enterprise 
publicity states: Right Force, Right Readiness, Right Cost. 
The United States Navy still most closely resembles a culture of command and 
control.  Echelon II Commanders and Resource Sponsors continue to defend and act on 
the best interests of the community they support rather than that of the enterprise.  There 
is no incentive to do otherwise.  These agencies, in general, reapply money (identified as 
savings) at their own level to: (1) fund high priority items that they feel will not be 
funded if savings are returned to the enterprise; and (2) avoid cuts in following years.  
Furthermore, numerous adjustments are made in the end game by FMB through pressure 
from OSD to “balance” accounts.  The Savings Target reviews of POM06 tried to get 
ahead of this maneuver by working the review in the Program Phase, but still resulted in 
Resource Sponsors re-shuffling to balance Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs), as 
opposed to providing cash back to the CNO for recapitalization.  That is, the process of 
savings is hindered by current cultural norms and behaviors, reflected in the maintenance 
and protection of the status quo.  The following subsections describe some imbedded 
cultural issues that continue to plague the United States Navy and to strangle initiatives 
that invoke change. 
 
1. Pressure to Spend  
Commanders must take painful steps to achieve efficiencies in day to day 
operations.  Even when they are inclined to search for extra efficiencies to return to the 
enterprise, Commanders have little financial incentive to find them because those who 
save money generally do not benefit from the savings.  The DON executes based on its 
annual budget.  Failure to spend one’s entire annual budget reduces the chance of 
maintaining that budget in future years.  As a result, when budgets have not been spent in 
full (i.e., savings have been identified), then a nagging question is raised: does your 
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organization need all of its funds (Hale, 2002)?  Consequently, budgets are cut.  
Therefore, there is no fiscal incentive to achieve savings in the interest of the enterprise.   
For example, the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) has made some 
noteworthy changes in their organization.  Their “4-Phase Focus” (discussed in follow-on 
sections) helped the Command realize $35 million in harvested savings in FY04.  
NAVSUP set out to achieve efficiencies within its organization to contribute to the 
enterprise.  Despite sacrifices made to realize savings, and the discipline to return those 
savings to the enterprise, NAVSUP’s budget was cut in FY05.  Although there are other 
drivers to reducing budgets, in this case, it appears that one of the reasons the 
organization’s budget was cut was a result of operating more efficiently.  Hence, there is 




Even if Commanders are inclined to identify initiatives, search for efficiencies, 
and realize savings, (as stated above) they have little financial incentive because those 
commands that save generally do not benefit from the savings.  Even though the DON 
has restructured the POM process and implemented the Program Review (PR) process in 
the odd years, there is still a certain level of scrutiny given to the budget on an annual 
basis.  New threats to national security, high profile programs, pork26, etc. constitute 
reasons for making adjustments to (or extracting money from) an account that has been 
more efficient in the past year and has realized savings.    
Unless top leadership creates a system in which there will be no retribution for 
realizing savings and commands can receive a portion of their harvest for gain sharing 
purposes (to continue to motivate personnel to seek greater efficiencies) commands will 
continue to either spend their budgets in full or reapply savings at their own level.  There 
is no policy or mechanism in place that allows a portion of the savings to be returned to 
                                                 
26 Pork, according to the Webster’s Dictionary, is a government appropriation that provides funds for 
local improvements “designed to ingratiate legislators with their constituents (Jones and McCaffery, 
2003).” 
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the commands that identified and harvested the savings.  As such, commands do not reap 
any benefit for their efforts to become more efficient. 
In some recent cases, Commanders have expressed a willingness to sacrifice 
command goals for the sake of the enterprise.27  This reaction may be a result of a slowly 
changing culture.  However, Commanders stated that the command goals that will be 
unachievable must be communicated to the CNO.  The understanding is that the CNO 
would then prioritize between the goals of the Commander (approved by the CNO) and 
return savings to some part of the enterprise.  In these cases, the Commanders do not 
want to be held accountable for the goals that they cannot attain as a result of their 
sacrifice.  Therefore, expectations of outcome would be changed and goals not met as a 
result of savings.28 
In some cases, (although it may seem obvious, it is important to report) the lack of 
awareness of Sea Enterprise and its associated initiatives, results in the lack of incentive 
to save.  Although Echelon II commands have been the target audience of the Sea 
Enterprise “message,” lower Echelon levels of command must be aware of the Sea 
Enterprise effort, its vision, and associated initiatives if they are to be incentivized to 
behave any differently (i.e., become more efficient) than they currently do. 
 
3. Congressional Intervention 
Empowered by the Constitution of the United States, the Congress has the sole 
authority to raise (provide and maintain) a Navy (and Army).  Additionally, the Congress 
and a significant contractor base also bring public opinion to bear in the difficult issue of 
how much to spend on Defense (Hale, 2002).  However, the nature of the Congressional 
system does not favor efficiency.  In some cases, Congress appropriates funds for 
programs  not  requested  by  the  Department  of  Defense.  As  a result, the programs for  
 
                                                 
27 As per interview with CBC member. 
28 Although this may seem like a logical process in that Commanders will not be susceptible to 
retribution; this may be a dangerous path to follow.  It may not be prudent to start sacrificing goals for the 
sake of returning savings to the enterprise.  The goal of Sea Enterprise, as the author understands it, is to 
return savings to the enterprise while still meeting all of the organization’s goals and meeting expected 
outcomes.  It is understood that this task becomes increasingly difficult when programs are not fully 
funded, and therefore adds to the complexity of this issue.   
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which funds are appropriated often meet political rather than military needs.  This is 
referred to as pork (mentioned in the previous subsection).  Pork spending creates 
inefficiency.   
Senator John McCain has argued that recent Defense bills contain anywhere from 
$2 billion to $7 billion in added programs not requested by the administration, earmarks 
that identify funds for particular businesses or institutions, and increases for what 
McCain terms low-priority programs.29  This equates to approximately 1-3% of total 
Defense spending.  Again in 2004, Senator McCain communicated his concern about 
pork spending; “…there is over $11 billion in unrequested, unauthorized, run-of-the-mill 
pork projects contained in the 1,182 pages of this conference report (FY04 
Appropriations Bill).30  Although many might debate which programs are included in 
Senator McCain’s figures, there is little doubt that these figures provide some notion of 
the level of spending.    
Pork spending creates a culture of inefficiency that permeates Congress, the 
Department of the Navy, and subsequently the Department of Defense as a whole.  
Unless policies are put in place to limit or restrict Congress from funding political needs, 
inefficient pork spending will continue to stifle progress made by Sea Enterprise and 
associated initiatives and culture change efforts. 
Moreover, Congress imposes strict controls on transfer authority as it pertains to 
“time” and “color” of money.  Currently, the Secretary of Defense has transfer authority 
that may not exceed $1.5 billion of the total appropriations to the Department of Defense 
for that fiscal year (FY05 Appropriations Bill).  Increased leniency in transfer authority 
between appropriation accounts (e.g. between Operations and Maintenance and 
Procurement accounts) would allow for greater flexibility in “accounting” for savings and 
take advantage of a mechanism already in place to facilitate recapitalization.     
 
 
                                                 
29 Press release by Senator John McCain on H.R. 4205: The National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001, October 12, 2000.  The press release discusses both the authorization and appropriation 
acts for 2001; abstracted from Hale, 2002. 






For any change to be meaningful and lasting, leaders must hold their “direct 
reports” accountable for implementation and execution of initiatives.  This idea mandates 
that some form of an audit or review be implemented, especially in the beginning.  With a 
certain level of scrutiny involved in the process, commands will work towards 
achievement of the objectives.  
Every year since the inception of Sea Enterprise (2002), the CNO’s Guidance has 
assigned Sea Enterprise tasking to Navy leadership.  N40 staff members actively track 
tasking assigned to the Corporate Business Council.  However, beyond what is reported 
in quarterly and end-of-year updates to the CNO, there is no existing 
database/mechanism or staff that tracks all of the Sea Enterprise tasking.  If the 
organization is serious about change, it must be serious about holding itself accountable 
for all change initiatives.   
As previously mentioned, in some cases Echelon II Commanders and Resource 
Sponsors reapply money at their own level and in the interest of their own communities.  
However, this response directly violates the mandate to return savings to the CBC to 
recapitalize and modernize the fleet in an effort to realize the goals of Sea Power 21.  
However, commands are not held accountable for this action.  Hence, Commanders will 
continue to reapply money at their own level if there are no repercussions and 
consequences. 
Echelon II CNO Execution Reviews appear to hold commands accountable for 
Sea Enterprise initiative implementation.  However, this research suggests this is not 
sufficient.  Many adjustments are made throughout the year, especially toward the end of 
the fiscal year.  Therefore, CNO Execution Reviews and quarterly/end-of-year updates 
may not present an accurate assessment of the command’s progress toward changing the 





Cultural change within the Navy cannot occur unless the driving force behind the 
change, the CNO, communicates the mission and vision of Sea Enterprise throughout the 
enterprise.  Top level leaders, and specifically Echelon II Commanders, have been 
identified as the target audience with respect to development and implementation of the 
initiatives.  This communication is essential for creating a buy-in and initiating top-down 
leadership.  CBC governance states, “[t]he establishment of a corporate decision-making 
body to motivate and facilitate progress on Sea Enterprise initiatives is necessary to 
facilitate this transformation process.”  But, if the organization is not cognizant of the 
effort, and actions are not taken to translate awareness into action, no meaningful change 
will occur.   
 
3. Creating Short-Term Wins 
Real transformation takes time, and [transformation] risks losing momentum if 
there are no short-term goals to meet and celebrate (Kotter, 1990).  As such, there have 
been noteworthy changes that have proven successful in pursuit of Sea Enterprise 
objectives.  Some commands have adopted private sector business practices in an effort 
to become more agile, more effective, more efficient, and more responsive.  A few 
examples are provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
a. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
In 2003, NAVSEA embarked upon a transformational journey.  The 
organization has engaged in a phased approach which aims to lay the foundation 
necessary to institutionalize continuous improvement, focus on shaping the workforce, 
efficiently run the “business” using Lean and Six Sigma principles, and capture savings 
to support recapitalization of the Fleet.  Figure 4.3 depicts a graphical representation of 
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Figure 4.3 NAVSEA Phases of Transformation 
 
On 14 January 2005, NAVSEA promulgated its “Task Force Lean – 
NAVSEA Lean Implementation Plan.”  This plan outlines the roadmap for implementing 
Lean Six Sigma principles at NAVSEA Headquarters, associated Program Executive 
Officer (PEOs), Shipyards, and Field Activities.  NAVSEA Lean includes the industry 
recognized best practices of Lean, Six Sigma,31 and Theory of Constraints, and 
prioritized application of these methodologies to the right value streams to achieve 
maximum business results (NAVSEA Lean Implementation Plan, 2005). 
Of particular note, NAVSEA has conducted 17 Execution Reviews with 
Echelon 3 and 4 commands.  Commanding Officers presented their Execution Plans, 
performance metrics, and strategies in support of NAVSEA’s and CNO’s 2004 Guidance.  
                                                 
 31 Lean and Six Sigma are corporate business practices that emerged in the private sector in the 
1990’s and have more recently been adopted into the public sector; namely the Department of Defense.  
Lean is a toolset that eliminates waste, speeds up the value delivered to the customer, and helps create the 
most efficient system to deliver what the customer expects.  Six Sigma is a toolset that eliminates variation, 
fosters fact-based decision making, and helps create a system that consistently delivers what the customer 
expects. 
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Also, multiple Commanding Officers and senior leaders attended every review, enabling 
leaders to effectively share lessons learned from other command initiatives.   
NAVSEA and the PEOs have set a goal of achieving $250M savings in 
FY07 above and beyond current intelligent targets.  Also, they endeavor to reduce lead 
times for their products and services.  Initial efforts have been focused on Warfare 
Centers and Shipyards, but the plan is to cover all organizations through the NAVSEA 
Lines of Business (LOB) and PEO Business model.  That is, NAVSEA’s Task Force 
Lean initiative will be executed through the Command’s four LOBs – Engineering, 
Industrial Operations, Warfare Centers, and Business Operations – and the PEOs.  Figure 
4.4 illustrates the NAVSEA LOB and PEO business model and how the LOBs, in 
conjunction with the PEOs and Program Managers (PMs), span the entire spectrum of the 
ship and weapon life cycles – from research and development to design to acquisition to 
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Figure 4.4 NAVSEA Lines of Business (LOBs) 
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NAVSEA has engaged in various initiatives32 in an effort to transform its 
organization and become more efficient.  Further, a top-down leadership approach has 
been communicated to and engaged in at the Echelon 3 and 4 levels which may help 
create a culture of greater efficiency.  Additionally, NAVSEA’s LOB approach allows all 
levels of the organization to work collaboratively, thus promoting the change to a 
collaborative culture.  The key to NAVSEA’s success will be its ability to maintain a 
sense of urgency and continue to act itself into a new way of thinking. 
 
b. Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) has made some 
noteworthy changes in its organization.  They have engaged in a “4-Phase Focus” 
approach.  The phases consist of: Phase I, Recapitalization; Phase II, Products and 
Services (i.e., identifying what they mean to the community); Phase III, Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP); and Phase IV, Human Capital Strategy.  Overall, Phase I 
consisted of identifying NAVSUP’s mission and organizational alignment.  The 
community established some new commands, while others were consolidated or 
eliminated altogether.  Furthermore, functional area changes were made to streamline 
processes.  Within the contracting domain, contracts were awarded to consolidate ten 
procurement servers into one.  Within the financial management domain, fourteen 
comptroller shops were reduced to four, with a total financial management workforce 
reduction of 134 billets (NAVSUP, 2005).   
During Phase II, NAVSUP shifted its mission and alignment focus from 
external to internal.  As such, the organization identified its products and services, 
aligned corporate costs to products and services, identified a measurable output, assigned 
accountability, and drove down costs by driving efficiency into processes.  Phase II has 
confirmed that there is still work to be accomplished.  It has also initiated a revisit to 
Phase I to institutionalize Lean and Six Sigma principles.  Overall, NAVSUP has made a 
concerted effort to become more efficient and realize savings.   
 
                                                 
32 The initiatives annotated here are not conclusive but rather provided as examples of business 
practices adopted and recently implemented throughout NAVSEA’s organization. 
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c. Logistics Planning and Innovation (N40) 
The Logistics Planning and Innovation Office (N40) has operated as a 
silent partner throughout the “life” of Sea Enterprise.  Mr. Mark Honecker serves as the 
Executive Secretary to the CBC (Corporate Business Council).  Therefore, his staff has 
assumed all administrative responsibilities to include publishing the meeting agendas and 
procedures, disseminating schedule information and maintaining and publishing records 
of meetings.  Specifically, the N40 office has embarked on a communications campaign, 
initiated incentive award programs, coordinated and planned off-sites with Sea Enterprise 
principals, and arranged industry visits to gain knowledge of transformation best business 
practices first-hand, among others.   
The N40 office has developed a Sea Enterprise website where information 
regarding the effort is communicated.  The website provides links to various documents, 
briefings, and guidance.  It advertises success stories throughout the Navy in an effort to 
convey how Sea Enterprise is influencing the workforce.  Also, in the effort to foster 
innovation in the workforce, N40 has drafted the Sea Enterprise Innovation Awards 
Program.  The purpose of the award is to promote innovation by recognizing and 
rewarding productivity/efficiency initiatives that help transform the manner in which 
Naval Forces are supported.  Further, by creating a database of successful innovations, 
N40 hopes to communicate them and leverage learning across the enterprise.  
Additionally, this program endeavors to: 
• Raise senior leadership awareness about successful innovations that 
advance the objectives of Sea Enterprise; 
• Incentivize better business process practices, capabilities and results; 
• Facilitate communications and sharing of best practices among commands 
of all types; 
• Serve as input for better understanding and management of the innovation 
process;  
• Inform organizational strategy, planning and opportunities for learning 




Also, the program has been created to eliminate redundancies, change 
processes, and improve productivity; thus incentivize new behaviors (culture).  
Ultimately and ideally, this award will help create more savings in support of Sea Power 
21. 
Numerous off-sites have been coordinated by N40.  Most of the off-sites 
have involved Echelon II commands and typically focus on developing metrics for 
command operations.  However, an off-site was conducted with N4 (and associated 
stakeholders) in January, 2005 that focused on strategic issues.  Overall, off-sites have 
been a useful tool to collaborate ideas, generate methodologies, and communicate 
expectations. 
Overall, N40 has helped develop and communicate new Sea Enterprise 
initiatives, track CBC Sea Enterprise tasking from the CNO, leverage new ideas from the 
fleet, among many other initiatives.  However, these efforts are a result of a collateral 
duty assigned to N40.  As depicted throughout this chapter, the breadth of obstacles 
associated with the success of Sea Enterprise are many.  In fact, the efforts made by N40 
to propel the Sea Enterprise effort are astonishing.  Nonetheless, their mandate seems 
overwhelming.  If the enterprise is serious about change, then serious measures must be 
taken toward change. 
 
d. Short-Win Summary 
As stated in Chapter II, it is important to keep short-term gains as part of 
the overall strategy because when people realize that progress toward the achievement of 
the goal will take a long time, interest level drops.  Therefore, commitment to short-term 
gains keeps the urgency level up33 and forces analytical assessment and analysis that can 
clarify or revise visions.   
However, it is important to understand that although business practices 
have been implemented, methodologies tested, and restructurings have occurred, this 
analysis concludes there is insufficient evidence that these initiatives have contributed to 
achieving the goals of Sea Enterprise.  If harvested savings (as identified by the unifying 
                                                 
33 This is true provided that a sense of urgency exists.  In this case, the enterprise as a whole does not 
have a sense of urgency. 
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definition: savings that are realized once returned to the enterprise) is the single most 
telling measure of success of Sea Enterprise, then the measurable outcome to date as 
measured by harvested savings is relatively small.  Some say about $40 million.  Creating 
efficiencies, then identifying and harvesting savings within a command are only part of 
the “process” of savings.  Returning savings to the enterprise must follow to complete the 
harvest.  Until such business practices, methodologies, restructuring, and Congressional 
restraints in law can be directly and identifiably tied to savings returned to the enterprise 
(CNO/N8) then the “success” of Sea Enterprise cannot be determined with any 
reasonable accuracy.  
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Overall, this chapter provided the analysis necessary to respond to the research 
questions raised in Chapter I.  First, the “process” of realizing savings was identified to 
analyze the various identifiable obstacles to reaping harvested savings.  It is a course of 
action that requires communication, clarity of purpose, and consensus and perhaps most 
importantly, accountability and execution.  Second, this chapter presented an analysis of 
the Sea Enterprise effort to change the existing culture of command and control.  
Imbedded cultural norms make change management difficult within DON.  Third, 
leadership involvement in the overall effort was discussed.  Top-down leadership is 
essential to success, however issues such as accountability and awareness (penetrating 
lower levels of the organization) hinder creating a sense of urgency and guiding coalition, 
thus lessening the impact of the effort.  Then, under the management umbrella of 
leadership, some examples of short-term wins were identified as a result of implemented 





V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis examined the Department of the Navy’s Sea Enterprise effort from its 
inception in June 2002 to May 2005 (the time of this research).  The ability of Sea 
Enterprise to create efficiencies throughout the organization and ultimately to harvest 
savings was explored to assess whether it has made an impact on recapitalizing and 
modernizing the U.S. Navy, thus enabling the Sea Power 21 vision to create the right 
force, with the right readiness, at the right cost.    
Chapter I provided an introduction and outlined the research questions that were 
analyzed and from which conclusions made in this thesis were drawn.  Chapter II 
supplied background information to lay the foundation for the issues raised throughout 
this thesis.  Further, the chapter explored topics that related to the highly complex matter 
of identifying and realizing savings within the United States Navy.  Those topics included 
a highly interrelated mix of managerial issues such as organizational culture, leadership, 
execution and cutback management.  Chapter III identified a unique and dynamic set of 
goals and objectives, structures, responsibilities, and processes which present a range of 
issues that can and do impact the effort as a whole.  Chapter IV analyzed the research 
questions posed in Chapter I.   The analysis was framed on the basis of identifying the 
“process” of realizing savings, the desire to change the Navy’s organizational culture, and 
the leadership involvement in the Sea Enterprise effort.   
The research methodology used for this thesis consisted of collecting relevant 
data from a variety of sources for correlation, comparison, and analysis. Books, 
memoranda, briefs, testimonies, instructions, internet sites, magazine and journal articles, 
among others were reviewed.  Additionally, a series of personal interviews with high 
level Department of the Navy military and civilian leaders was conducted.  As a result of 
a thorough investigation of the sources stated, an analysis was conducted. 
As discussed in this thesis, the Navy must transform its structures, processes, and 
ways of doing business as a result of spiraling operating costs, force structure trends, an 
aging force structure, and increasing manpower costs.  The Navy is under pressure to do 
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more within given resources as requirements and operating costs rise and funding levels 
increase slightly or remain flat.  Furthermore, the Navy must transform to replace Cold 
War-era systems to combat new, asymmetric threats that have made it more challenging 
to bring the fight to the enemy.  This issue remains paramount.  Given major changes in 
the geo-political world, and the high cost of defending the nation, one seeks to understand 
the threat fully and then on that basis construct the appropriate force to influence or 
combat the enemy.  Therefore, from a Sea Enterprise perspective, the Navy must not only 
bring the fight to the enemy, but do so with the right force, with the right readiness, at the 
right cost.  Further, the Navy must foster and sustain a culture of innovation and 
efficiency to help realize the savings necessary for recapitalization and sound 
management.  As such, Sea Enterprise is critical to this effort.   
It is important to understand that the purpose of this thesis was not to present a 
case study of Sea Enterprise.  Although there are various examples of successes in 
Echelon II commands that ought to be acknowledged (select cases summarized in 
Chapter IV), it was not the primary purpose of this thesis to research and report on such 
successes.  Rather, this thesis aimed to determine if the Department of the Navy has 
realized the savings forecasted for the various Sea Enterprise initiatives and to surface the 
various fundamental issues and challenges associated with the effort.  By identifying the 
various issues and challenges, this thesis has sought to offer recommendations to 
accelerate the effort.  Moreover, cultural resistance to change, onerous bureaucratic 
frameworks, accountability, awareness, and fiscal and organizational disincentives to 
save represent a few of the issues and challenges the Navy faces.  To realize savings, 
recapitalize the fleet, and meet the twenty-first century threat (principally, the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT)), the Navy must address and surmount such hurdles.  This thesis 
also offers recommendations for top level Navy leadership to help establish equal footing 
across the enterprise, a clarity of purpose, a single point of reference, and a strategy to 
accelerate the Sea Enterprise effort.   
 
B. LIMITATIONS 
Several variables limited this research.  One limitation was the restricted 
timeframe during which research was conducted.  The timeframe did not allow for 
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multiple travel opportunities to collect data from the various commands with ties to the 
Sea Enterprise effort.  As a substitute, email and telephone correspondence was utilized. 
At the time of research, the author was unable to establish that a Plan of Action 
and Milestones (POA&M) for Sea Enterprise existed.  As such, it was difficult to 
determine what stage of development the effort was in.  Although implementation of a 
POA&M would be effective to track progress in the early stages, a Sea Enterprise “life” 
prolonging mechanism should be established to facilitate continuous change for the long 
run.  As a result of this research, it was concluded that Sea Enterprise is still in the initial 
stages of development. 
As a result of this research, several different “savings” data sets were discovered.  
A single point of reference with respect to the Sea Enterprise effort was unidentifiable.  
That is, a single point of reference for the following key elements does not exist: CNO 
Sea Enterprise-related directives, initiative generation, initiative implementation, 
initiative execution, initiative status tracking, savings identification, savings tracking, 
savings accountability, and savings returned to the enterprise (harvested savings).  This 
limitation required the author to compare and analyze data from numerous sources from 
which conclusions and recommendations were made.   
Based on the research conducted, uniformity in terminology and in accountability 
in procedures and responsibilities were not evident; thus it was difficult to navigate 
throughout the Sea Enterprise “process.”  As a result, it was challenging to determine the 
“real” amount of harvested savings Sea Enterprise initiatives may have generated.  
Therefore, data were analyzed on the basis of the “process” of savings and the unifying 
definition of what constitutes savings identified by the author.  
 
C.  CONCLUSIONS 
Given the reasons stated throughout this thesis, the Sea Enterprise effort is 
essential to the DON to change the existing culture and behaviors, to change the 
structures and processes, and perhaps most importantly, to harvest savings.  The Sea 
Enterprise effort has resulted in efficiencies and realized savings at the Echelon II level as 
reported by Echelon II Commanders.  In some cases, streamlined processes and improved 
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business practices have made a noticeable impact.  Commands currently employing a 
significant number of Sea Enterprise initiatives are the Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA), the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), the Commander, Naval 
Installations Command (CNI), and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), 
among others.  However, according to the purpose of Sea Enterprise as understood and 
identified by the author, the effort as a whole does not appear to have met its intended 
objectives to date.   
Ensure savings are harvested and returned to the corporation for 
reallocation against other corporate Navy priorities. 
Admiral Vern Clark, CNO Guidance for 2005 
Using this absolute definition by the CNO, the original premise of Sea Enterprise 
has not been realized.  The conclusions in this chapter were derived on this basis.  
Furthermore, some recommendations are provided that may help accelerate the Sea 
Enterprise effort.   
 
1. Clarity of Purpose 
As a result of this research, the author concludes that the purpose of Sea 
Enterprise is to utilize harvested savings to recapitalize the fleet in support of the Sea 
Power 21 vision (Clark, 2005; Aviles and Nathman, 2004; Mullen and Young, 2003).  
Further, Sea Enterprise seeks to encourage innovation and the identification of 
efficiencies within Echelon II commands.  In some cases, as a result of Sea Enterprise 
initiatives, efficiencies have been identified and thus savings have been realized.  
However, it appears that these savings are not being returned to the enterprise as was 
intended when Sea Enterprise was initiated.  Overall, a clarity of purpose for the Sea 
Enterprise effort at the enterprise level and throughout the Department of the Navy is not 
evident.  If consensus cannot be attained at the enterprise level as to the purpose of Sea 
Enterprise, then it can be reasonably asserted that efforts made to communicate the effort 




2. Uniformity of Effort 
Throughout the Navy enterprise, a standard definition for what constitutes savings 
does not exist.  The term “savings” is used in various ways throughout the Department of 
the Navy which contributes to a lack of cooperation and uniformity of effort as a whole.  
Specifically, the term “savings” is used when efficiencies are identified within a 
particular program or account prior to or during execution.  The term is also used when 
funds are unexecuted in an execution year within specific Echelon II Command accounts.  
“Savings” is also used when Echelon II commands enter unexecuted funds data in PBIS 
and forward them to the cognizant Resource Sponsor.34   
To address the disparity, a unifying definition of what constitutes realized savings 
is suggested: “forecasted savings” should be recognized as harvested or realized 
“savings” when (and only when) unexecuted funds are returned to the CBC/N8 (the 
enterprise) for recapitalization (with final discretion of the CNO).   
Consensus has not been gained as to when savings are, in fact, considered 
savings.  Savings are being reported in the tens of billions of dollars ($20B-$30B) 
however, according to the author’s unifying definition (indicated above) harvested 
savings more closely reflect approximately $40M.  Unless consensus is gained as to what 
constitutes savings and savings are identified and communicated in “real” terms, a 
common operating picture throughout the enterprise cannot be established, thus savings 
attributed to Sea Enterprise cannot be measured with any reasonable accuracy.   
 
3. Harvested Savings: The Process and the Measure  
The process of realizing harvested savings is bureaucratic, difficult, and not well-
defined.  Nor is it compatible with sound business practices (GAO, 2004).  As depicted in 
Chapter IV, there are various factors that have influenced forecasted savings resulting in 
modest actual harvested savings.  A few of these influencing factors (besides not having 
a  clear  definition  of  what  constitutes  savings)  are  high  savings  targets, “fact of life”  
 
                                                  
34 These different uses of the term “savings” were drawn from various interviews conducted consisting 
of respondents who ranged from the Echelon II to OPNAV levels of command. 
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changes, reapplication of savings at the Echelon II or Resource Sponsor level, human 
error in data entry, pressure to spend budgets in full, lack of incentives to save, and 
congressional intervention.   
The process of harvesting savings is not well-defined.  That is, the savings 
“process” requires several exchanges where lack of accountability in the Navy’s financial 
systems and reapplication at the Echelon II and Resource Sponsor level contribute to 
savings “loss” and reapplication.  However, as defined by the author, the steps in this 
“process” model are: the determination of initiatives to be pursued, implementation of 
initiatives, identification of possible savings due to efficiencies (and other reasons), 
tracking savings, and finally harvesting savings.  This course of action requires 
communication, clarity of purpose, and consensus and perhaps most importantly, 
accountability and execution.  Furthermore, not all entities track the same initiatives.  The 
same Sea Enterprise initiatives must be recognized and tracked by all those commands 
involved in the “process” to prevent inadvertent loss of focus or inadvertent or deliberate 
adjustment to savings.  
“Accounting” for savings is a prevalent problem within the Department of the 
Navy, and subsequently with the Sea Enterprise effort.  Savings, even if properly 
managed, are susceptible to shrinkage or loss.  Specifically, the DON financial systems 
lack the accountability, transparency, and integration among systems to “account” for 
savings accurately.   Despite the implementation of a new budget database, the Program 
Budget Information System (PBIS), the DON continues to confront persistent financial 
and business management problems related to its systems, processes (including internal 
controls), and people (human capital).   
 
4. Culture 
The culture of an organization speaks of the values, beliefs, and behaviors that are 
shared by the members of the organization.  A culture of efficiency still has not 
permeated the United States Navy.  Pressure to spend budgets in full, lack of incentives 
to save, and in some cases congressional intervention contribute to the inefficiencies that 
still persist throughout the Department. 
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Within some Echelon II commands, efficiencies have been identified and savings 
have, in fact, been harvested.  However, it appears that savings are not being returned to 
the enterprise for reinvestment as anticipated.  The DON executes based on its annual 
budget.  The belief is pervasive within DON that failure to spend one’s entire annual 
budget (even when savings are realized), means that budgets will be cut in future years.  
Hence, there is a perceived retribution for efficient behavior.   
Even if Commanders are inclined to identify initiatives, search for efficiencies, 
and realize savings, they are offered little financial incentive to do so because those 
commands that save generally do not benefit from the savings.  Unless a system is 
created in which there will be no penalty for realizing savings and commands can receive 
a substantial portion of their harvest for gain sharing purposes (to continue to motivate 
personnel to seek greater efficiencies) commands will continue either to spend their 
budgets in full or reapply savings at their own level.  Currently, there is no policy or 
mechanism in place that allows a portion of the savings to be returned to the commands 
that identified and harvested the savings.  As such, commands do not reap any benefit for 
their effort to operate more efficiently and returning savings to corporate Navy. 
Congress presents another obstacle toward efficiency.  In some cases, Congress 
appropriates funds for programs not requested by the Department of Defense.  As a 
result, the programs for which funds are appropriated often meet political rather than 
military needs.  This behavior is referred to as “pork spending.”  Pork spending uses tax 
payer dollars for military programs in the states/districts of the representatives/senators, 
which provide jobs for the local population and constituency.  As a result, programs not 
requested by DON are valued as job producing programs representing unnecessary ‘fat’.  
Moreover, often what is given to the DON as pork does not include the full future cost of 
the item; e.g. dollars for maintenance, training, building runways or pier support 
structures may not be included.  Therefore, pork spending creates a culture of 
inefficiency that permeates Congress, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of 





5. Communication and Awareness 
To operate as a more flexible and capable enterprise, the Navy must not only 
influence senior level Navy leadership to communicate the urgency of Sea Enterprise, but 
also penetrate the unit level.  Without clear communication of the strategy, purpose, and 
goals of Sea Enterprise to the entire Navy, and appropriate incentives and constraints to 
guide behavior, the department will not obtain the following necessary to change the 
culture.  Transformation, and more importantly the transformation of culture, will be 
possible only when thousands of people within the Navy are willing to help/contribute.  
This campaign should occur at every level of the organization, communicating the crisis 
of rising costs (discretionary, non-discretionary, shipbuilding, manpower, GWOT), thus 
creating a sense of urgency.  Moreover, a positive image of what the future Navy should 
look like to meet and defeat any foe should provide a strong stimulus to change.  
Currently, awareness at the lower levels of the Navy is not evident which inhibits the 
effort as a whole. 
Communication and agreement between OPNAV and the Secretariat needs 
improvement.  It is important to recognize that savings targets and initiatives are typically 
driven by OPNAV while the rest of the budget cycle is run by the Secretariat.  Currently, 
savings objectives and targets are not clearly being communicated to FMB analysts and 
subsequently through OSD analysts, and efforts to harvest savings are often defeated or 
significantly jeopardized.  
 
6. Savings Targets 
Sea Enterprise savings targets may be overly optimistic.  In the midst of the 
GWOT and the war in Iraq, the cost of operations is increasing and, as stated in Chapter 
I, the Navy’s share of TOA is not increasing.  Also, the cost of human capital has 
continued to rise since the early 1990’s despite extensive reductions in both civilian and 
military personnel.  Therefore, forecasted savings levels in the tens of billions of dollars 





7. Educated Driving Force 
A Navy group of the “best and brightest” to serve as a compliance force for 
business process transformation within Sea Enterprise with the leverage to ensure results 
are achieved does not exist.  The Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group 
(SSG) serves as a team of innovators that generate revolutionary warfare concepts to help 
introduce new leading technologies into the Navy.  The SSG is a good example of a 
group of high-level thinkers that focus its efforts on war-fighting concepts, and therefore 
remain operationally focused.  The Navy could adopt a similar model to research and 
develop revolutionary business and transformational venues.  
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS     
 
1. Establish Equal Footing: Renew Strategy and Purpose 
Every effort should be made to accelerate the Sea Enterprise effort.  This thesis 
has described various reasons why Sea Enterprise is essential in facets such as force 
readiness, culture, survivability, and sustained change.  However, in order to accelerate 
the effort, renewing or even redeveloping the Sea Enterprise purpose and strategy is 
recommended.  One of the major impairments to Sea Enterprise is the absence of a 
strategy (to include a POA&M) for implementation of a communication campaign, 
savings initiatives, changing culture, capturing savings, and finally recapitalizing savings 
as was the stated intention for Sea Enterprise.     
 
a. Establish a Single Point of Reference 
Establish a single point of reference for CNO Sea Enterprise-related 
directives, initiative generation, initiative implementation, initiative execution, initiative 
status tracking, savings identification, savings tracking, savings accountability, and 
savings returned to the enterprise (harvested savings).  The Corporate Business Council 
could assume this role.  However, currently the CBC may not be staffed appropriately to 




b. Renew Purpose 
Renew the purpose of Sea Enterprise.  One of the main determinants for 
the disparity between “reported” and “harvested” savings as reported in this thesis is the 
lack of consensus as to the purpose of Sea Enterprise.  If, in fact, Sea Enterprise is the 
vehicle to foster an innovative culture, identify efficiencies, realize savings, and 
recapitalize savings in support of Sea Power 21, then it is recommended that this mandate 
be adhered to throughout the Navy.  Further, once the purpose is defined, its measures of 
success should be clear.  If harvested savings are the goal, then it should become the 
primary performance measure.  However, as previously mentioned, the goal should be 
well-defined.  That is, a unifying definition of what constitutes Sea Enterprise savings 
should exist.  This thesis proposes that “forecasted savings” should be recognized as 
harvested or realized “savings” when (and only when) unexecuted funds are returned to 
the CBC/N8 (the enterprise) for recapitalization (with final discretion of the CNO), as it 
was intended when Sea Enterprise was initiated.  By renewing and revalidating the 
purpose of Sea Enterprise coupled with establishing a single point of reference, the Navy 
can begin to address and talk about Sea Enterprise and associated savings in real terms.  
Thus, the real effects of Sea Enterprise can be communicated, evaluated, and validated 
throughout the Navy. 
 
c. Develop Strategy and Devise Communications Campaign 
Once the purpose is defined, a strategy for achieving Sea Enterprise goals 
and objectives (short-term and long-term) should be developed.  Of all the objectives and 
goals that will be developed, influencing change by creating a sense of urgency, and thus 
harvesting enterprise savings should be among the items at the top of the list.  It is 
important to realize that one objective relies on the next: harvesting savings will not 
occur unless change occurs and neither will occur unless a sense of urgency throughout 
the Navy is created.  Further, it is suggested that the strategy incorporate a 
communications campaign that will broadcast the Sea Enterprise vision within and 
throughout the entire Department of the Navy to establish a following of thousands.  
On a micro level, in order to penetrate and influence behavior at the lowest 
level, the communications campaign may serve as the vehicle to communicate, describe, 
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and show how individuals can and must become meaningful enablers of the “process.”  
Each individual within each command should have a clear understanding as to the 
“process” of harvesting savings (as indicated earlier in this thesis), where one fits into 
that process, and most importantly, how one’s behavior and execution of particular tasks 
can contribute to the Sea Enterprise effort.  This will provide the individual Sailor and 
Officer as well as DON civilian with a sense of involvement and thus incentivize desired 
new behaviors.  However, this strategy should be well-developed and clearly articulated 
in the communications campaign.  Otherwise the initiative to promote Sea Enterprise and 
ultimately change the culture could potentially be forfeited.   
One option for the communications campaign is to embark upon a Navy-
wide Sea Enterprise stand-down initiative.  Although, stand-downs typically have been 
reactive in nature, this dramatic action would allow Sea Enterprise leadership to contact 
thousands and communicate the potential crisis (of not realizing the Sea Power 21 vision) 
and the great opportunity Sea Enterprise affords them.  The agenda for the stand-down 
should consist of, but not be limited to, the reasons why Sea Enterprise is necessary35, its 
purpose, difficulties and challenges in realizing the goals, and most importantly, how 
each individual can and must become a meaningful enabler of the “process.”  A stand-
down could help serve as a branding opportunity for a marketing campaign.  With a Sea 
Enterprise brand (e.g., $ea Enterpri$e), the Navy could potentially create a sense of 
urgency and excitement among thousands of Navy personnel necessary to invoke deep 
change. 
On a macro level, the strategy should be to communicate the purpose to 
top Navy leadership (4-star and 3-star BODs), as well as to the Echelon II Commanders.  
This communications campaign should entail face-to-face delivery.  I propose that the 
most influential figure deliver the message, the CNO.  Further, it must be emphasized 
that the overarching purpose for Sea Enterprise is to harvest savings at the enterprise 
level.  Without Echelon II command cooperation and execution, substantial savings 
                                                 
35 The reasons should be similar to those identified in this research: the Navy must transform its 
structures, processes, and ways of doing business as a result of increasing operating costs, force structure 
trends, aging force structure, and increasing manpower costs. Also, the Navy must transform to replace 
Cold War-era systems to combat new, asymmetric threats that have made it more challenging to bring the 
fight to enemies. 
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cannot be expected.  Also, a Commander should be cognizant of the role his/her 
command plays in the “process.”  That is, all commands must become meaningful 
enablers of the process to catapult change and realize true savings. 
  
d. Set More Achievable Savings Targets 
Sea Enterprise officials should ensure savings targets remain achievable.  
Due to rising costs in operating the Navy, as well as the GWOT and the war in Iraq, it is 
unlikely that the Navy can conceivably save money in the tens of billions of dollars       
(~ $45B-$50B as previously forecasted) and return that money back to the enterprise 
given the current policies and procedures.  The Navy should certainly set stretch goals, 
but such goals should remain within its purview.  By establishing a framework; that is, by 
clearly stating the goals and objectives of Sea Enterprise and ensuring that the processes 
and procedures are clear to attain the goals, then more achievable targets can be set and 
achieved.   
 
2. Develop a Mechanism to Capture and Incentivize Savings 
It is recommended that the Navy develop and implement a mechanism to capture 
and incentivize future savings.   That is, the Navy should create accounts throughout the 
enterprise (e.g., Enterprise Recapitalization Accounts) that channel funds back to the 
CNO for reinvestment from money saved in execution.  Further, the accounts could offer 
a “Share in Savings” approach in which commands could receive a substantial portion of 
their harvest for gain sharing purposes (to continue to motivate personnel to seek greater 
efficiencies).  The transaction that returns a percentage of the contribution would occur 
between the Type Commander (TYCOM) and the contributing command.   
Agreement at the Congressional level could pose a significant road block.  That 
is, without language within the Appropriations/Authorization Act that specifically 
authorizes the use of Sea Enterprise savings for enterprise (CNO/CBC/N8) use only, the 
Navy will be limited in its flexibility.  Ideally, such a clause would allow aggregated 
reporting to protect against decrements in future year budgets, and thus prevent efficient 
operations from being penalized.  The advantages to implementing these accounts are 
that (1) they would provide a more capable means to manage and “account” for savings, 
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(2) they would incentivize commands to save since there would be no penalty for 
realizing savings, and (3) a percentage of the savings would be returned to them.    
Congress should grant increased flexibility to the Department of Defense and the 
services in transfer authority in terms of amount, “time”, and “color” of money.  Greater 
flexibility in these areas between appropriation accounts (e.g. between Operations and 
Maintenance and Procurement accounts) would allow for greater flexibility in 
“accounting” for savings and take advantage of a mechanism already in place to facilitate 
recapitalization.    The Secretary of Defense has, in fact, requested such a change in the 
proposed Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act.  This Act reads: 
...Upon a determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is 
necessary in the national interest, each fiscal year he may transfer an 
amount not to exceed two and one-half percent of the total appropriations 
or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year... 
The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act 
 
3. Communicate Recapitalization Successes 
Sea Enterprise recapitalization successes should be communicated to contributing 
commands and throughout the entire Navy.  By disclosing how Sea Enterprise savings 
are used, commands can begin to feel like meaningful contributors to the “process.” For 
example, during an execution year, an Echelon II command may be able to identify and 
realize savings, and return them to the enterprise.  As a result, the Navy might be able to 
buy an F-18.  The Navy could provide a certificate or similar form of appreciation to that 
command for contributing to the purchase of an F-18.  Similarly, all commands that 
contributed to the purchase should be notified and be given formal recognition.  This 
course of action would allow commands throughout the Navy to feel a sense of 







4. Campaign of Transformation 
The Navy should embark upon a decisive campaign of transformation in which 
leadership, performance goals, processes, workforce competencies, performance 
management, learning, and results are utilized as drivers to create a more agile, relevant, 
and efficient fighting force.  A comprehensive program of transformation should be 
driven by people.  Therefore, the Navy must identify its “change agents.”  By estimates 
made by Jack Welch36, real change agents comprise less than 10 percent of all 
businesspeople (and in the case of the Navy enterprise, this percentage may be smaller).   
“They (change agents) are true believers who champion change, know how to [execute], 
and love every second of the process (Welch, 2005).”  According to Welch, a significant 
majority, about 70 to 80 percent, may not lead the charge, but once they are convinced 
change is necessary, they say, “OK already, get on with it.”  Therefore, to lead this 
campaign of change, the Navy needs true believers at the top, and “get on with it types” 
everywhere else.   
The Navy should invest in the people who are true believers in making sustained 
change and upending status quo as part of the Navy’s culture.  Therefore, change agents 
should address the Navy from the standpoint of the people, structure, and tools, as well as 
broader cultural and behavioral issues that will drive the workforce and invoke change.  
Such a program should consider the following issues: 
• Setting clear performance goals that determine the behaviors that people 
will be performing necessary for change. 
• Defining the working processes that will support those goals, and 
adjusting the organizational structure to make processes visible, 
measurable and manageable. 
• Identifying the skills and competencies the will lead to the right behaviors 
and outcomes. 
• Creating performance measurement and reward systems that are aligned 
with business and performance goals and that properly motivate and 
incentivize behavior. 
• Putting in place the right technologies to support collaboration and 
knowledge sharing. (Page and Pearson, 2004) 
 
                                                 
36 Jack Welch is the former CEO (1981-2001) of the General Electric Company. 
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It is critical to attach every change or Sea Enterprise initiative to a clear purpose 
or goal.  Changing just for change’s sake is counterproductive and burdensome.   
It is a disaster when companies take all the hype about change literally and 
grab every new management fad that comes down the pike.  It’s change 
overload!  Some big companies (or large organizations) adopt ten different 
change initiatives at once and run in eight different directions.  Nothing 
meaningful ever happens in these flavor-of-the-month kinds of situations 
except that, for most employees, work feels very frantic and disorganized  
Jack Welch, 2005   
In fact, change should be a relatively orderly process.  Therefore, in order for this 
campaign to work (1) people must understand why change is necessary and where it will 
lead them, and (2) the Navy must develop a center for a dedicated and talented cadre that 
will help champion the change campaign.  For purposes of this thesis, the author will call 
this center the Center for Navy Business Intelligence (CNBI).  
 
a. Center for Navy Business Intelligence 
Creating a Center for a Navy Business Intelligence type organization is a 
sound and necessary approach to change that the Navy could use in order to realize and 
sustain continuous transformation.  The idea of CNBI is centered on continuous 
education, investment in research, and identifying the right people to provide intelligent 
change recommendations and assist in its execution.  Further, the center would serve as a 
consortium to include the many stakeholders of Sea Enterprise to ensure collaboration 
occurs in the early stages.  The center ought to be the CNO’s change agent resource. 
The CNBI should be lead by an individual known for his/her forward 
leaning attributes of the O-7 (perhaps retired) or above rank who will offer revolutionary 
leadership to its members and carry weight when issues are brought to the table for 
implementation.  Potential CNBI members should be considered on a recommendation 
basis only from their reporting senior, and go through a rigorous interview process, with 
the final selection decision resting with the CNO.  The Center should report directly to 
the CNO for change/transformational-related issues.  It is not just a matter of students to 
perform research, but to create a center solely dedicated to broadening the issue of 
business process transformation by the best creative minds in the Navy organization.  As 
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such, a core group of members could be fielded from the United States Naval Academy 
(USNA), the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the Naval War College (NWC), and 
select NROTC units.  However, this list should not exclude other smart, innovative, and 
dedicated individuals from other academic institutions from consideration.  The Center 
ought to comprise a spectrum of seasoned professionals, particularly in the Human 
Resource (HR) and Information Technology (IT) fields.  Therefore, graduate degrees (to 
include MBAs) from NPS, NWC, and other accredited schools should be emphasized for 
CNBI members to incorporate an academic dimension to the Center.  Additionally, all 
Navy designators should be represented to collaborate fleet experience and expertise with 
smart, educated public and private business professionals. 
The Center should establish partnerships and launch programs with 
academic institutions and the private sector dealing with improving the innovative 
capability of a “public bureaucracy.”  The Navy is a public bureaucracy that presents 
even greater challenges to cost-reducing initiatives because there is no competition.  
Therefore, partners of CNBI should include strong ties to public policy centers of 
excellence already in existence at the state and federal levels as well as other academic 
institutions.  Additionally, CNBI should endeavor to spawn revolutionary ideas about 
organizational development and performance, and seed test beds within various 
organizations to determine their usefulness and perhaps more importantly, the extent to 
which the ideas are truly revolutionary and/or disruptive.  CNBI should conduct field 
research to help create a “Value Index” for organizations.  This concept would help the 
Navy evaluate the value of an organization and each of the services or products it 
delivers.  Such a concept is vital to help leadership determine not only what the Navy 
should be doing, but perhaps more importantly, what the Navy should not be doing as the 
enterprise and the forces that influence it continue to change. 
 
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
1. Uniformed and Civilian Workforce Feedback 
Create a survey of the Navy workforce, to include both military and civilian 
personnel.  The survey could be created to determine what impact Sea Enterprise has had 
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on the workforce.  Such a survey would provide a qualitative assessment of the impact of 
the Sea Enterprise effort.  It is essential that all Echelons of the Navy are represented to 
reflect its true effect.  As a result of the research, it should be determined how best to 
embark on its communication campaign and market/brand Sea Enterprise.    
 
2. Research and Develop Enterprise Resource Accounts 
Even if Commanders are inclined to identify initiatives, search for efficiencies, 
and realize savings, they have little financial incentive to do so because those commands 
that save generally do not benefit from the savings.  Further, when savings are identified, 
budgets are cut in future years.  As such, a student could research and develop the idea of 
creating accounts (Enterprise Resource Accounts) that could channel funds back to the 
CNO for reinvestment from money saved from execution.  Also, explore a “Share in 
Savings” approach in which commands could receive a substantial portion of their 
harvest for gain sharing purposes (to continue to motivate personnel to seek greater 
efficiencies).  Currently, policies are not in place to allow such an account to function 
under the control of the CNO only.  Therefore, it is critical to explore the possibilities of 
gaining Congressional approval to create such an account that will help incentivize and 
facilitate better management and “accounting” for savings. 
 
3. Develop the Idea for a Center for Navy Business Intelligence 
Creating a Center for Navy Business Intelligence (CNBI) is a sound and logical 
approach to change that the Navy should consider to realize and sustain continuous 
transformation.  The idea of a CNBI is centered on continuous education, investment in 
research, and identifying the right people to provide intelligent change recommendations 
and assist in its execution.  The center ought to be the CNO’s change agent resource.  As 
such, a student could explore the different ways CNBI could be established as its own 
command.  Further, it would be beneficial to research and develop a mission statement 
and vision for the organization to include specific goals and objectives.  Another 
suggestion is to explore initial detailing options and funding requirements.  Finally, a 
student could develop a proposal for the Center to include but not be limited to the 
104
following areas: membership, feasibility, supportability, detail requirements, mission 
statement, vision, literature review, possible locations, and funding requirements. 
 
F. AFTERWORD 
Given the major changes to the geo-political world, rising operating costs, flat or 
even declining funding levels, and the GWOT and war in Iraq, the Navy must transform 
its structures, processes, and ways of doing business.  As such, Sea Enterprise is an 
essential vehicle to change the culture, improve business processes, and harvest savings 
within the DON in support of the Sea Power 21 vision.  It was not the primary purpose of 
this thesis to research and report on Sea Enterprise successes.  Rather, this thesis aimed to 
determine if the Department of the Navy has realized the savings forecasted for the 
various Sea Enterprise initiatives and to surface the various fundamental issues and 
challenges associated with the effort.       
Sea Enterprise is a critical enabler to realizing the vision of Sea Power 21.  As 
such, the results of this research are intended to provide greater awareness and knowledge 
of the journey ahead.  Further, this research is intended to provide positive tangible 
benefit to the Department of the Navy as a reference to be consulted when exploring 
lessons learned and when deciding on future initiatives to transform, recapitalize, and 
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